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FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO: (835 PAGE STUDY (VOL. I) PAGES 1-84 (PARTS I, II, III & IV)

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February 1967

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I. INTRODUCTION

This review presents the facts and observations which bear on the bona fides of the Soviet defector Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.

The highlights of NOSENKO's biography, as he has given it to CIA, are as follows: He was born 30 October 1927, the first son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, shipyard worker who in 1939 was to become Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding. After graduating in 1951 from the Institute of International Relations in Moscow, where he specialized in international law and the English language, NOSENKO entered the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet Navy, serving first as a translator assigned to the intelligence staff of the Seventh (Far Eastern) Fleet and then as a senior translator and political officer at an intelligence unit of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet. In mid-March 1953, immediately following STALIN's death, NOSENKO left the Naval GRU to become a junior case officer in the KGB. He was assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from 1953 to mid-1955. During this period he was initially responsible for operational activity surrounding American journalists in Moscow and later for operations against U.S. Army Attaches at the Embassy. When transferred to the newly organized Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1955, NOSENKO had as his targets visitors to the Soviet Union from the United States and the countries of the British Commonwealth. Having handled a number of successful tourist operations, NOSENKO in 1958 was promoted to Deputy Chief of the section responsible for operations against American, British, and Canadian nationals. Eighteen months later NOSENKO returned to the U.S. Embassy Section as its Deputy Chief. Between January 1960 and January 1962 he was second-in-charge of all KGB activities against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and personally supervised operations against the Embassy Security Officer, the Second Chief Directorate's most important counterintelligence target at the time, and against American code clerks, collectively the Directorate's most important recruitment targets. At the ~~end of~~ December 1961 NOSENKO again was transferred to the Tourist Department, this time as Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section. Six months later he was made Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, and in mid-1963 he became its First Deputy Chief.

From the time he first contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO's status has been under examination. Only now, three years following his defection in February 1964, is a definitive study of the bona fides question possible: the voluminous and diverse reports by NOSENKO, coupled with collateral information, required that much time for assimilation, correlation, investigation, and evaluation. NOSENKO's own testimony, interspersed with representative subsidiary cases stemming from or related to his reports, constitutes a large part of the evidence. This review also draws upon statements and actions by other Soviets, collations with materials from other sources, and opinions by specialists of various kinds. These factual elements are presented without comment or interpretation, except in the penultimate section of the review where the evidence on the bona fides of NOSENKO is evaluated and analyzed.

TOP SECRET

This review is presented in the following format:

Part II: A summary of developments in the NOSENKO case from 1962 to the present, including his clandestine meetings with CIA, his defection, and the subsequent debriefings and interrogations.

Part III: A discussion of the operational circumstances of NOSENKO's 1962 contact with CIA and his defection two years later. Included is discussion of CIA's information concerning NOSENKO prior to his first contact in Geneva, NOSENKO's explanation of the reasons for his presence in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, NOSENKO's motivations first for establishing clandestine contact with American Intelligence and later for defecting to the United States, NOSENKO's pattern of activity in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, and the reactions of the Soviets, both official and unofficial, to the defection.

Part IV: The non-KGB aspects of NOSENKO's life, both before and after he joined Soviet State Security Service, as he described them and as others have reported them.

Part V: The positions and responsibilities of NOSENKO in the KGB, the operations with which he was associated, his travels abroad, the awards and promotions which he received, and other Soviet sources' statements on these points.

Part VI: NOSENKO's production, especially in counterintelligence matters not discussed in the preceding section. Key cases are discussed in detail and other leads are summarized.

Part VII: Specialists' assessments of NOSENKO: by the CIA graphologist who studied his handwriting; by the CIA psychologist and psychiatrist who examined him; by the former KGB officer Peter DERYABIN; by the CIA case officers who handled him; and by the CIA polygraph operator who tested him.

Part VIII: Interpretation of the evidence and conclusions about the <u>bona fides</u> of NOSENKO.

Part IX: The implications of the conclusions in Part VIII for certain other sources.

There are several sources currently or formerly associated with the Soviet Intelligence services who are repeatedly referred to in this review. They include the following:

- Anatoliy Mikhailovich GOLITSYN, a KGB officer who defected in Helsinki to U.S. authorities on 15 December 1961.

sensitive source

- [redacted]

- [redacted]

sensitive source

[redacted]

- Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV, a KGB officer whose case is reviewed in Part VI.D.7.c.

[redacted]

[redacted]

source

- [redacted] former [redacted] agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, [redacted]

All pertinent material received by CIA prior to 15 January 1967 has been taken into account in this review of NOSENKO's <u>bona fides</u>.

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II. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. Introduction

From the CIA side, the NOSENKO case can be divided into three periods: the first Geneva phase of June 1962, the second Geneva phase of January-February 1964, and the post-defection handling of NOSENKO from February 1964 to date. The rest of Part II is separated into these three periods accordingly.

B. First Geneva Phase (June 1962)

The NOSENKO case opened on 5 June 1962 in the corridors of the Palais des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations Disarmament Conference. A then-unidentified Soviet, known to him by sight from conference meetings, approached U.S. Foreign Service Officer David MARK with the suggestion that they get together for a talk the following day. In the late afternoon of 6 June, the same Soviet motioned MARK aside and said that he would like to talk to him privately as soon as possible. He told MARK that he was "not going to pump him for information, but simply wanted to tell him some things." A luncheon meeting was arranged for 9 June, although the Soviet clearly preferred an earlier date. MARK advised CIA of the appointment, explaining that he thought the approach so unusual that it might be an offer of cooperation or defection. He said he believed the Soviet to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Soviet delegation to the arms talks.

At the 9 June luncheon with MARK, NOSENKO told MARK that he, NOSENKO, was a KGB counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew that MARK had previously served in Moscow and believed he was connected with American Intelligence.* He needed approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB operational funds which he squandered on liquor and a prostitute in Geneva, and he offered for this amount to sell two pieces of information to American Intelligence. The first of these was the identity of a former U.S. Embassy employee in Moscow who was a KGB agent and, as of 1962, was "near ciphers" in the Washington area; the second was the identity of a Soviet in Moscow who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, was actually planted on American Intelligence. Although NOSENKO at first told MARK that he would stop at the sale of these two items, he later stated: "I know you won't let me alone now." At another point NOSENKO said: "I will not work in Moscow, but I come out about once a year." NOSENKO also gave MARK a brief chronological account of his personal and professional past. MARK explained that although he was not an intelligence officer, he could place NOSENKO in contact with the Intelligence Chief in Geneva later that same day.

MARK introduced NOSENKO to a CIA officer at 2000 hours that evening, and a three-hour meeting followed at a CIA safehouse in Geneva. Describing himself as a KGB Major experienced in operations against the American Embassy in Moscow and against tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA

* Another Soviet source, [redacted] has also reported that the KGB suspected MARK to be an American Intelligence officer; although he has never served in CIA, MARK did engage in a number of operational support activities on behalf of CIA while stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

officer of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell two items of information. He said that the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, although in the ensuing discussion he said also that he was dissatisfied with the Communist regime in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO emphasized, nevertheless, that he had no intention of becoming an American agent--this was to be a one-time transaction, and after that he would have no further contact with CIA.

Despite this original reticence, NOSENKO supplied considerable biographic information on himself and also discussed in general terms certain additional KGB operations as well as KGB organization and operational methods in Moscow. He understood, as he had told MARK earlier in the day, that CIA would want more information than the two items which he originally offered, and he agreed to meet again two days later.

NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva in June 1962, always in the same safehouse. With the second meeting on 11 June, his initial reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and operations, most of his information being concerned with the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for counterintelligence and security within the USSR. NOSENKO seemed to be what he claimed to be: a KGB officer in a sensitive position with knowledge of important KGB operations.

NOSENKO returned to Moscow on 15 June, having promised to do everything within the limits imposed by personal security considerations to collect information of interest; the areas of CIA interest had been outlined to him. The only restrictions he placed on his cooperation were his absolute refusal to permit operational contact with him inside the USSR and his request that no mention of his collaboration be made in correspondence to Moscow. He promised to notify CIA, via an address he was given, when he came to the West again.

C. Second Geneva Phase (January-February 1964)

NOSENKO accompanied the Soviet delegation to a later session of the Disarmament Conference (one having gone by in the interim without his participation), arriving in Geneva on 19 January 1964. The next day he sent a cable to his CIA accommodation address announcing his presence. At the first of the new series of meetings on 23 January he announced that he had decided to defect to the United States citing as reasons his continuing disaffection with the Soviet regime and the fact that he probably would not have further opportunities to travel to the West in the foreseeable future. Although he implied that he wanted to defect as soon as possible, he agreed to remain in place in Geneva for at least two or three weeks while arrangements for his reception were being made in Washington. NOSENKO had brought a large amount of new information, much of it in scribbled notes, on KGB operational activity collected in the 18 months since his last meeting with CIA. Twelve more meetings were held in a Geneva safehouse over the next twelve days, varying in length from one and a half to six hours.

D. Post-Defection Handling (February 1964-Present)

On 4 February, four days before the date tentatively selected for NOSENKO's defection, he reported that a cable had been received from KGB Headquarters ordering his immediate return to participate in a KGB conference on foreign tourism to

the Soviet Union.* Exfiltration plans were then implemented, and NOSENKO was driven across the border to Germany that same night. Debriefings resumed in a Frankfurt safehouse. The decision was reached on 11 February to bring NOSENKO to the United States, and in the early evening of 12 February he and his CIA escorts arrived in Washington via commercial aircraft, thence to a safehouse in the Washington area.

At the request of the Swiss and Soviet Governments, NOSENKO met on 14 February with representatives of their respective Washington Embassies in the offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. He told both that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In answer to the questions of the Soviet representatives, he orally renounced his status and rights as a citizen of the USSR.

CIA completed its initial debriefings of NOSENKO on 18 February, and on 24 February he was introduced to representatives of the FBI for questioning. At about the same time, there was a marked decline in NOSENKO's discipline: He became evasive and uncooperative, refusing to answer some of the questions of his debriefers, both CIA and FBI; his nightlife in Washington and nearby cities was punctuated by drinking bouts, crude behavior, and disputes with his security escort. He explained these actions by saying that he was under great tension as a result of his defection, abandonment of his wife and children, and the disgrace that he had brought to his family name. It was against this background that CIA acceded to NOSENKO's demand for a vacation. On 12 March, therefore, NOSENKO left Washington with a CIA case officer and two CIA security guards for a two-week vacation in Hawaii. There his behavior deterioriated still further: He drank heavily and almost constantly; he engaged in sexual acts with a number of prostitutes; he was loud and crude in public places; and he spent money extravagently ($800 on one prostitute) and conspicuously (a $100 bill for a restaurant tip).

During NOSENKO's absence, consultations were held with the FBI concerning steps to be taken to restrict his movements and activities. Both agencies feared that his behavior would bring about unwanted attention and publicity, perhaps police arrest, and that doubts about his <u>bona fides</u>, which were becoming known to a widening group of people in the U.S. Government, might be inadvertently revealed to NOSENKO himself. The FBI on 1 April said it would "not interpose objection" to the CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's freedom of movement. The Acting Attorney General, the Department of State, and the White House were also notified of the CIA plan at this time.

In the morning of 4 April NOSENKO was driven to another safehouse in a Washington suburb, ostensibly only for a polygraph examination. At the safehouse NOSENKO was given a routine polygraph examination, lasting over three hours; he

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* See Parts III E and III F for further discussions of this cable.

"reacted significantly" to questions concerning his intentions in defecting to the United States and other related matters.* He was then told that he would remain at this safehouse, which thenceforward was his regular place of residence. Since this time NOSENKO has had contacts with CIA personnel only, has been under full-time guard, and has not been permitted access to news media.

Detailed interrogation of NOSENKO was begun on 4 April 1964 in order to obtain information which he had been reluctant to give in debriefings, and to clarify contradictions in what he had already reported. This phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964.

Despite the searching nature of the questions and the implicit and explicit doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO proved himself willing to answer, or to try to answer, questions put to him. Because much more information pertinent to the question of his bona fides had to be obtained, a new phase of interrogation was begun in mid-May 1964. Different interrogators were introduced and questioning was resumed in a neutral, non-hostile manner. The period of neutral questioning continued until mid-November 1964.

After further consultations with the FBI, a new round of hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965. NOSENKO was questioned for a total of about 140 hours by individual interrogators and by interrogation teams consisting of two or three men, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous reports. He admitted that certain of his earlier statements had been incorrect, and that he could not explain contradictions in his testimony. Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had been basically truthful, and that he had come to the United States solely for the reasons he had originally given. This interrogation was broken off on 5 March 1965.

Questioning of NOSENKO during the summer and autumn of 1964 and the interrogations of January and February 1965 concentrated on the period of his claimed service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from January 1960 to January 1962. Among the reasons for selecting this particular period were the comparatively large amount of collateral information available against which NOSENKO's statements could be checked; the importance of the U.S. Embassy and its personnel as the outstanding KGB Second Chief Directorate targets; their importance from the standpoint of American security; and the extent of NOSENKO's knowledge about the activities of the U.S. Embassy Section, in his capacity as its Deputy Chief.

In keeping with Soviet practice, CIA asked NOSENKO in February 1965 to sign a series of interrogation reports, so-called "protocols," most of which concern the period of his claimed service in the American Department. These were written by the CIA interrogators, and they were designed to incorporate

* See Part VII.C. for a further discussion of the polygraph tests.

NOSENKO's exact statements and meaning on various specific subjects. The protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary portions of a "confession," but rather as distilled and final statements of what he did and did not know concerning particular topics. NOSENKO was asked to read each page of each protocol carefully and to sign his name at the bottom to indicate that he understood and agreed with its contents; he was allowed the use of a dictionary and was permitted to ask any questions and make any changes that he wished. (Amendments were entered by the interrogators and were initialed by NOSENKO.) NOSENKO was asked, after reading each page and after completing the entire protocol, whether he understood what was written there and whether there were any more changes he wished to make. He was then asked to sign and date the statement, "I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct," at the end of the final page. With one exception, which will be noted later, he did so calmly and without objections, although on one or two of them he remarked that his statements were presented in such a manner as to make them look foolish; although invited to do so, he was not able to suggest any changes of fact or presentation which would make them more accurate. Commenting on the use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said on 4 March 1965: "My life story is absolutely correct. Anything I have signed is absolutely correct. I absolutely understand what I am doing when I am signing any paper. This is an official document, and I fully understand what I'm doing when I sign it as being absolutely correct."

In May 1965 a CIA psychologist questioned NOSENKO in detail on his life from birth until 1953, when he said he entered the KGB, in an attempt to gain additional insights into his character and personality.

Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until 13 August 1965 with the participation of Peter DERYABIN, a former KGB officer. These interrogations, the first to be held in Russian, were for the purpose of using DERYABIN's first-hand experience in the KGB to obtain a clearer understanding of NOSENKO's personal and professional background.

There were no further debriefings or interrogations until 18 October 1966. On this date NOSENKO was polygraphed on the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

During the period 19-25 October 1966, NOSENKO was questioned for seven days on specific aspects of selected topics ranging from his identity to his involvement in and knowledge of specific KGB operations. Questioning was in both Russian and English.

III. OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

A. Earlier Information on NOSENKO in Geneva

NOSENKO's name first came to the attention of CIA in October 1960 when he applied at the American Embassy in Moscow for a visa to enter the United States as a member of an automotive delegation. The following month CIA obtained copies of his passport photograph at two separate points on his TDY route to Cuba. There was no indication of intelligence affiliation, and when NOSENKO arrived under true name with the Soviet delegation in Geneva in March 1962, he was accorded no more than the interest routinely given by Western intelligence services to Soviets travelling abroad.* After arriving in Switzerland, however, but before establishing contact with CIA, NOSENKO was involved in at least two incidents which brought him to the special notice of the British, Swiss, American, and possibly the West German services.

The first of these occurred in April 1962. At a cocktail party in Geneva, NOSENKO met a female secretary employed by the British Foreign Office. He saw her several days later in the corridors of the Palais des Nations and asked her to have dinner with him, and a date was made for several evenings later. According to the secretary's later account as reported by her superiors: "They talked about Marxism, the Chinese, Yugoslavia, and love; NOSENKO was obviously smitten with her, became verbally amorous, and told her that he would like to take her off to a desert island." The girl felt that NOSENKO probably was not interested in her for intelligence purposes, but seemed to be genuinely attracted by her. From her conversations with NOSENKO she was able to report that "he had been in submarines during the war and, according to himself, had risen to the rank of Commander. He was a member of the Communist Party. His father was in the Ministry of Shipping. He himself had served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1948 and 1949 and had apparently visited England but had not been stationed there." NOSENKO also told her that he was acquainted with [redacted] of the [redacted] publishing house in London.** When NOSENKO became too persistent in his attentions, the secretary reported the contact to her superiors, was withdrawn immediately from Switzerland, and later resigned from the Foreign Office.

This same incident also brought NOSENKO to the attention of the Swiss service, which later reported it to CIA, without details, as an attempt on NOSENKO's part to recruit the girl.

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*Although NOSENKO was described in reports (held by CIA) concerning recruitment approaches to Americans in Moscow prior to his first arrival in Geneva, there was no basis in these reports to identify the Soviet described as NOSENKO. The name NOSENKO did not appear in these earlier reports.

**[redacted] was one of NOSENKO's targets during a 1957 trip to the Soviet Union. NOSENKO used the alias NIKOLAYEV in his contacts with [redacted] and, in CIA debriefings, gave this as the reason he was forced to use the name NIKOLAYEV in the two trips he made to London in 1957 and 1959. The secretary knew NOSENKO by true name. (See Parts V.D.3.d. and V.E.8. for discussion of [redacted])

According to this report, "after a time it became evident that NOSENKO's interest in her was not only sexual, but also in information to which she had access in the course of her duties." A [redacted] official in Geneva told CIA that NOSENKO had definitely tried to recruit the secretary and that he attempted to obtain "disarmament secrets" from her.

At his second meeting with CIA on 11 June 1962, NOSENKO described the same incident, in the context of reporting a possible KGB penetration of British counterintelligence: "I decided to try to take this English girl to bed. And this had nothing to do with work. No, it was simply (sex)...And Yurka [Yuriy GUK, First Chief Directorate officer in Geneva] said to me: 'Listen, Yura. Be careful, because we have people even in British counterintelligence.'" NOSENKO described the incident as follows:

> "After I had been here a week or two there was a reception for members of the delegation and at it I saw a certain English girl. Then RUSK gave a reception and she was there again. I came to the reception, she saw me, and I went up to her. She said that it was very nice to make my acquaintance, and that's all. M.S. ROGOV (TSYMBAL) was there. He said to me: 'Yura, it looks to me like you are going to bed with that girl.' I answered: 'What do you mean, Mikhail Stepanovich? She just interests me.' I had already decided to try to get her in bed...But, listen further. After this she used to go to the Disarmament Conferences. Well, to make it short, I asked this girl for a date. She is Scottish, Scottish, not English, and works in an office here. We agreed to meet at a restaurant. I asked my friends which restaurant here is the best, where there isn't a crowd. We went to the restaurant and sat there all evening--all alone. There were just the two of us. The restaurant is under the ground and is called 'Day and Night' in Russian, 'Jour et Nuit.' We sat there and then she asked me where we could meet again. A day later we met again. Again in the restaurant and then we took a walk. She got me bothered and then gave me the brush-off. I called her once. She wasn't at home. I called again. Again she was out. I called a third time. She wasn't there. She thought that I was an intelligence officer and that I was interested in her for this reason. This, honestly, wasn't so. I had only one thing in mind. She was quite a woman...But the English girl felt that she was being developed. I met three times with her. Three times we were at the restaurant and she told them [her superiors] this. She knew that I am Russian. She told them this and they [NOSENKO whistled, apparently signifying that they terminated the relationship] at once. She knew from the very beginning that I am Russian, from the very beginning. In short, I told her a lot of things--well, you know--so to get her into bed. Well, we were walking on the quay and I said to her: 'How about going up to your place?' she answered: 'I can't.' 'Why?' I said, 'I'll take off my shoes and come on tiptoe.' She answered: 'Is it possible for me to come to you?' I said: 'You can't come to my place. There would be a knock on the door at once. The Swiss would tell the Americans and that would be the end. I can't do this.' So all I could do was have her next to the parapet. But the English felt--and nothing was heard about this, but

she is no longer here. She got into trouble and I fee sorry for her because maybe they have fired her. Because they--the Foreign Office--keep only... Speaking honestly, as a human being, I am concerned that they might fire her. Because there was nothing more to it than this one thing."

The second event bringing NOSENKO to special notice occurred at about the same time that NOSENKO established contact with CIA and may, in fact, have been the incident which he said drove him to contact David MARK. On 15 June 1962 (ten days after NOSENKO approached MARK) [redacted] the permanent representative of [redacted] in Geneva, told his host at luncheon, American Ambassador TUBBY, that two girls from the Ba-Ta-Clan Club, a strip-tease bar in Geneva, had come to the [redacted] consulate apparently seeking visas. The girls had told of two Soviets, one about 30 and the other about 40, who had visited the club recently (no date was provided by [redacted]. According to the girls, [redacted] said, the two Soviets had attempted to pass themselves off as Americans and had spent "hundreds" of francs drinking at the club. The name which [redacted] gave Ambassador TUBBY for one of these Soviets "sounded like IISENKOV." From their descriptions, the two Soviets were almost certainly NOSENKO and his friend A.K. KISLOV.* At his first meeting with CIA NOSENKO said that a week and a half earlier he spent 1500 Swiss francs in a single night of drinking and women with KISLOV. The necessity of repaying this money, taken from KGB operational funds, was the immediate cause of his contact with CIA, according to NOSENKO.

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*See Part III.D. for further information on KISLOV.

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B. Reasons for NOSENKO's Presence in Geneva (1962 and 1964)

1. TDY in 1962

When NOSENKO arrived in Geneva for the first time on 10 March 1962, he was listed officially as a Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs "expert" with the Delegation to the disarmament talks. Early during his second meeting with CIA on 11 June 1962, NOSENKO was asked to explain precisely why he had been sent out to Geneva. He replied as follows: "Right now, I came to provide counterintelligence support to the Disarmament Delegation... There is a special [KGB] department for delegations, a special one, recently created. And the chief of this department is simultaneously a deputy chief of the [Second Chief] Directorate. He is both chief of the department and deputy chief of the directorate so that there will be a person who can be held responsible if anything happens. Understand? The chief of the directorate [O.M. GRIBANOV] hated to sign all sorts of recommendations and so on, when someone can run off in Belgium or wherever he may be. This happened more than once, and he was summoned before the [CPSU] Central Committee. Therefore, he decided to create a new position. The person holding it is simultaneously chief of the department and deputy chief of the directorate and personally signs off on all matters concerning exits [from the USSR]. This was in order to avoid being called on the carpet...so that blame would fall not on the chief of the directorate, but on his deputy, who is in charge of this department and who signed off...

"This department," NOSENKO continued, "is concerned with departures abroad, that is, it checks all Soviet citizens who intend to travel abroad, both alone and as members of delegations. Since GOLITSYN [defected] in Finland, we have an order that no delegation is to be let out without an operational worker, not a single delegation... With me it happened as follows: I was not planning to go. They told me: 'You are going.' I said: 'I can't. I have a section. I have 15 people there, all operating people. Am I supposed to dump them? What can I do?' 'No, you are going,' was the reply. 'And what did the chief order?' I asked. The chief [NOSENKO was referring to GRIBANOV when he spoke of the "chief".] said: 'GROMYKO is going this time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is going, and somebody on an appropriate level must go with him. Not a case officer, not a senior case officer, not a deputy, but the chief of a section, or the deputy chief of a department, or a department chief.' Well, I was the most junior section chief. I was called in to my chief, my immediate chief, who is concerned with the Seventh Department. They had told him that it would be for a month and on this basis he gave me permission. And I have been here since 10 March."

Later during this second meeting NOSENKO volunteered that in addition to his security officer functions in Geneva, he had a special assignment to check on P.F. SHAKHOV, a senior advisor to the Soviet Delegation.* SHAKHOV had been noted in contact

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*CIA records show that SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States on numerous occasions since 1942, when he was assigned at the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He

with David MARK, believed by the KGB to be a CIA officer, NOSENKO reported, and on this basis the KGB suspected that SHAKHOV might be an American agent. NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested these suspicions in Geneva. He first gave SHAKHOV disinformation and looked for indications that he passed it on to American contacts. Next, SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally, NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB "dead drop" and checked back five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials which had been placed in it had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion from all this, he told CIA, was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters.

On later occasions NOSENKO reported that SHAKHOV had previously served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during this period he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. In 1966 NOSENKO named one person whom SHAKHOV had spotted and developed in the United States, [redacted] SHAKHOV, according to NOSENKO, was not and never had been a KGB officer. Asked why SHAKHOV was permitted to travel abroad when he was suspected of being an American agent, NOSENKO explained that since SHAKHOV belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad. "There was no proof, only suspicions," and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet Delegation, S.K. TSARAPKIN.

NOSENKO was questioned again about his 1962 assignment to Geneva during the February 1965 interrogations. His answers were incorporated in a "protocol" which NOSENKO certified as being correct on 26 February 1965. The protocol states: "GRIBANOV had nothing at all to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1962. I think that the fitness report written about me for this trip was signed by [F.D.] BOBKOV, since he was the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the Seventh [Tourist] Department. I did not personally discuss this trip with GRIBANOV before my departure from Moscow. My candidacy for this assignment was supported by [S.G.] BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, who supervised the work of the Eleventh [Soviet Delegations] Department which had the investigative file on SHAKHOV. BANNIKOV was concerned with the question of who should go as case officer on

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attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, the 1955 Paris Summit Conference, and many disarmament conferences over the years, and he has attended a number of sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV arrived in New York as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN in 1963. The Soviet defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that SHAKHOV's face is familiar to them; RASTVOROV identified him as an MVD officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow; and [redacted] identified him as an "employee of the KGB." [redacted], however, [redacted] said that SHAKHOV is "clean, a 'pure diplomat'" and that, to his knowledge, SHAKHOV was not engaged in any Soviet intelligence activity at that time.

sensitive source

*For further particulars on [redacted] see Part VI.D.6.

[redacted]

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this trip because SHAKHOV, who was suspected of possibly being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation. When the Eleventh Department was looking for a case officer to make this trip they wanted to have a chief of section because of the seriousness of the SHAKHOV case. When they asked in the Seventh Department [V.D.] CHELNOKOV agreed that I should take the assignment. There was no background or neighborhood investigation conducted on me in connection with my being approved for this trip.* My assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department, by the Personnel Office of the Second Chief Directorate, by the Central Personnel Office of the KGB and by the Central Committee of the CPSU."

NOSENKO was asked why he had been selected to make this trip immediately after assuming the duties of the Chief of the American Tourist Section, on the eve of the tourist season, and at a time when he had no deputy. He explained that it was not thought that the assignment would last so long, and CHELNOKOV, his superior and friend, had decided to let him go as a "treat."

During interrogations of October 1966 NOSENKO was questioned further about his 1962 assignment to Geneva as a security officer. He said that in this capacity he would necessarily know the identity of all other KGB officers serving with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva. There were only, besides himself, the KGB First Chief Directorate officers M.S. TSYMBAL and I.S. MAYOROV. (CIA, however, has tentatively identified three other delegation members as KGB staff officers: A.K. KISLOV, observed in Washington and in Moscow in what appears to have been KGB operational activity; V.G. FILATOV, who served as an alternate handler in the KGB operation with the NATO officer Georges PAQUES; and Oleg GRINEVSKIY, a member of the permanent Soviet Delegation who handled a [redacted] double agent during this same conference.) NOSENKO included GRINEVSKIY in the list of his own agents in Geneva in 1962 and said that, in Moscow, GRINEVSKIY was handled by an officer of the Intelligentsia and Correspondents Department of the Second Chief Directorate. KISLOV, according to NOSENKO, was an operational contact in Moscow of the Austria-Germany-Scandanavia Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate and was used in operations against the West German Embassy there. NOSENKO also said that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact during his earlier tour in the United States but was neither then nor later a KGB officer. He characterized FILATOV as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official and stated that he is "definitely not an intelligence officer."

NOSENKO was also requestioned during these interrogations on his investigation of SHAKHOV. After saying on the morning of 19 October 1966 that he had been personally told by the

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* NOSENKO has said that in 1960 he was turned down for a permanent assignment to Ethiopia because of his excessive drinking. (See Part V.E.4.a)

Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate that the SHAKHOV investigation was the main reason for his assignment to Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO later in the day stated: "My main task was to check the security of the delegation, plus SHAKHOV. You can't separate these tasks."

In this questioning NOSENKO described the basis for the suspicions of SHAKHOV, the lack of results from earlier investigations, and his own preparation for this assignment. He said that as a representative of the Soviet Delegations Department of the Second Chief Directorate, M.G. SITNIKOV had conducted investigations of SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but SITNIKOV was unable to resolve the questions concerning him. Because of the failure of these early efforts, the KGB decided to send "a senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962, and NOSENKO was chosen "to finish things up." Before leaving Moscow in March 1962, NOSENKO therefore discussed the SHAKHOV case with SITNIKOV and with one (fnu) LYALIN, the Soviet Delegations Department officer in charge of the SHAKHOV case; he also read various materials on the case, including an investigative plan drawn up by LYALIN. NOSENKO's description of these preparations provided the basis for the questioning which followed:

Question: Why was SHAKHOV under suspicion in June 1962?

NOSENKO: He was working with different delegations at different conferences and, being in Geneva, it was noticed that there was something which can be described as a connection with David MARK, who was considered a CIA officer.* Also, little, little, little things before.

Question: When did SHAKHOV and MARK first meet? How did it begin?

NOSENKO: In '60 or '61 there was a contact with MARK. I don't remember who reported it. The report was maybe from SITNIKOV in Geneva. MARK was known to the Second Chief Directorate as the Rezident [CIA Chief of Station] in Moscow. After Moscow he went to Geneva, and it was considered he must be the Rezident in Geneva. All the KGB officers going there were told to pay attention to him.

Question: What about the report?

NOSENKO: Maybe the officers saw the two going to the toilet. Maybe there was a contact. The file said "maybe." I was sent to Geneva to carry

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*As stated earlier, MARK was not a CIA officer in Moscow, although he did perform certain clandestine tasks for CIA. He had no CIA missions in Geneva in 1962. Within the context of discussion of NOSENKO's security officer duties during October 1966, NOSENKO was asked to name any CIA officers he knew to be present in Geneva during the 1962 disarmament talks. MARK was the only one he cited.

[redacted]

out measures to check... There were many little, little things. MARK maybe turned his head a certain way when SHAKHOV was talking. [S.M.] GOLUBEV, formerly of the Fourteenth [Counterintelligence] Department, was in the Soviet Delegation with SHAKHOV.* He noticed little details. When the officers in the United States decided to terminate SHAKHOV [as an agent], they wrote a report on him which said he was liking life in the U.S.--American products, money. He was pictured as not good and, in addition, he was not wanting to work as an agent.

2. The 1964 TDY

NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva, commencing on 19 January, was also in the capacity of security officer with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation. He said he was the only security officer for the group, which consisted of about 25 persons, and again he was officially listed as an "expert." NOSENKO reported that he had three or four agents within the delegation and an equal number of operational contacts. The only person whom he was instructed to watch in particular was A.A. TKACHEV, an interpreter, who had travelled to Austria in 1960 and 1961 and who, the KGB had noted, was in the habit of going about by himself. Other than this, according to NOSENKO, his responsibilities were general in nature.

NOSENKO explained during the February 1965 interrogations how he was selected for this TDY. The protocol he signed on 26 February 1965 states: "GRIBANOV had absolutely nothing to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1964. The fitness report on me for this trip was signed by [F.D.] BOBKOV. For the 1964 trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU was required for me or for any other members of the delegation who had been approved for the 1962 trip. It was my own personal wish to make this trip in 1964 and I had discussed the question with [V.D.] CHELNOKOV even in 1963 and had received his agreement. I had also talked about this with [M.V.] KHLOBUSTOV and [G.] PANCHENKO [both of the Soviet Delegations Department]. After it had been decided that I would go, in about the beginning of January 1964, [N.T.] ZHARIKOV, the Chief of the Department, suggested that a case officer might not be required with this delegation. KHLOBUSTROV, PANCHENKO, and [A.G.] KOVALENKO [Chief of the Tourist Department and NOSENKO's immediate supervisor] supported me for the assignment as a personal favor to me." With regard to GRIBANOV's knowledge of his assignment to Geneva this second time, NOSENKO said that he feared that if GRIBANOV learned about the TDY he would have said, "What, again?" and would not have permitted him to go. It was for this reason that NOSENKO did not discuss the trip with GRIBANOV, he said, and he did not believe that GRIBANOV, in fact, knew anything about it.

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*GOLUBEV was also identified by [redacted] sensitive source as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer. According to [redacted] he was one of several KGB officers forced to leave the United States in 1964 because he was well known to NOSENKO. There is no record in CIA files that GOLUBEV has ever been to Switzerland.

C. Motivations and Intentions of NOSENKO

1. Introduction

NOSENKO has not indicated that his professional status in the KGB, his standard of living in the Soviet Union, or his family life prompted him to volunteer to American Intelligence in 1962 and to defect to the United States in 1964. He initially told CIA that he had been unusually successful during his ten-year career as a KGB counterintelligence officer; his closest friends and the people whom he admired most were members of the KGB; he enjoyed his work. The NOSENKO family held a high social position, and their economic situation was "luxurious by Soviet standards." NOSENKO described his family life as close and harmonious. He spoke with fondness and pride about his two daughters, of his wife's tolerance and understanding, of the companionship she gave him. He expressed love and a sense of responsibility for his widowed mother, who heavily depended upon him after the death of his father in 1956. The elder NOSENKO won his son's admiration for having worked his way up from an apprentice pipefitter in a shipyard to the position of Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding. The NOSENKO name is honored in the home town of Nikolayevsk, where the shipyard has been renamed for the former minister and where a statue of him has been erected in the town square. By his own account, NOSENKO thus had had a rewarding home life and a successful and enjoyable career in the KGB.

2. Collaboration in 1962

At the outset in 1962, NOSENKO said he wanted to limit his reports to two items of information. Before the first meeting with CIA was over, he went beyond these two items to give details on the KGB Second Chief Directorate and other operations, and he offered to meet again. (Four more meetings ensued in 1962, with NOSENKO providing additional information on the KGB.) He would not defect, NOSENKO said, unless his personal safety was endangered by the KGB. Motivations in coming to American Intelligence, according to NOSENKO, were his financial emergency in Geneva and his disaffection for the Soviet regime.

a. Readiness to Report to CIA

During his 9 June meeting with David MARK, NOSENKO said he realized, even before talking to representatives of American Intelligence, that they would not be satisfied with the two items of information alone--he expected them to insist on more. He was introduced by MARK to a CIA case officer later the same day, and at the start of the meeting, the following dialogue took place:

NOSENKO:	You see, I am not planning to be your agent... and don't think that I am going to work with you in Moscow. No. No...
Case Officer:	As you have said, I am an intelligence officer as are you. And I think that we will understand one another.
NOSENKO:	You want to place our relationship on an agent basis.

Case Officer: Of course.

NOSENKO: Never in my life I will go in contact [with CIA] in Moscow or the USSR, never in my life. I also know about Langelle and POPOV;* I know this matter. When it was abroad it was fine, but when you decided to meet him in Moscow... You want more than I came with the intention of saying. You want to change this to a long-term relationship. Understand me. I am now the chief of a section. Before my departure [from Moscow] a decision was being reached-- and I have just spoken with my wife in Moscow-- I am supposed to become the deputy chief of a department. Do you understand what this is?

Case Officer: Why are you telling me this?

NOSENKO: Because I wanted to come [to CIA] only for a business deal, to give you these two cases, to receive money for this, and that's all. Goodbye. Perhaps, sometime, when I come abroad, we will meet one another and perhaps I will give you something. God knows. But I don't want to do this now. I don't want to and I am not prepared within myself for this... I am giving two interesting cases. The most interesting ones. I say to you honestly, the two most interesting ones. In the first of them ["ANDREY"**], I took no part. In the second [BELITSKIY***] I took part, even here.

Case Officer: I want you to understand that these two matters that you spoke to Mr. MARK about are of great importance to us. But I don't have to tell you that. You know that. But we are not going to play like children. You know perfectly well that it is worth every franc... What I want to tell you is this: of course I will ask you more, and of course I want to know as much as you know. If you refuse to answer, that's your business.

NOSENKO: I will tell what I am able to tell. What I know, I will tell. Of course, you yourself understand that there are things concerning our internal system that I cannot report to you. You yourself understand this.

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*The compromise of the CIA source in the GRU, P.S. POPOV, is discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.

**The case of "ANDREY," the KGB cryptonym for the agent Dayle SMITH, is discussed in Part VI.D.3.b.

***BELITSKIY, a KGB-controlled double agent, is discussed in Part VI.D.6

When the CIA officer said that he understood NOSENKO had been in the KGB since shortly after the war, NOSENKO, without further prompting, gave a detailed statement of his own personal past and his professional career. In this statement he described his education, his service in the GRU, his entry into the KGB and generally the functions and operating techniques of the various components of the KGB Second Chief Directorate in which he had served, along with the inclusive dates of his service in each. This account was very similar to that given MARK earlier in the day. Still without prompting, he discussed several specific KGB operations against Americans inside the Soviet Union, one involving the recruitment of a Yale University professor on the basis of homosexual compromise and the other an unsuccessful attempt to recruit an American code clerk. NOSENKO said he was personally involved in both cases.*

The question of his further assistance was then raised again: The CIA officer asked NOSENKO to tell more about the Yale professor, but NOSENKO demurred, stressing that the agreement involved only two pieces of information and ignoring the fact that he had already given considerably more:

NOSENKO:	I have told you enough for this day, and I will tell you only these two cases which I wanted to tell you, and it is enough for this day.
Case Officer:	How do you imagine that this is enough? You know that we work much the same way.
NOSENKO:	Yes.
Case Officer:	You know what interests us, of course.
NOSENKO:	I know it. Today I gave only two things. Let's meet one another [again].
Case Officer:	Good. But let me say this: What you tell me is your business. I am not going to try to bring any pressure at all...There is no argument about it. I am not going to say: 'Please see us in Moscow.' I don't want to see you in Moscow because it's too difficult. It is completely impossible. That's it. No more on that subject.
NOSENKO:	I said to David [MARK] before meeting you that I don't want to meet anyone anymore, not anyone.
Case Officer:	All right. Agreed.
NOSENKO:	In another place. I don't know whether I will come back here in a month or not...I personally don't want to, either, because my wife will be moaning at home. But I am afraid they will make me come, because I know the delegation. I know

*Richard BURGI and Joseph MORONE; see Parts V.D.4.b. and V.E.3.c., respectively. NOSENKO did not supply the names at this time.

the circumstances. They may make me come
In that case we can meet.

Case Officer: You know that I would not bring any pressure. That's something we understand because we are both in this business. You and I are in the same business, so you can't--

NOSENKO: Let me interrupt. Why are we bargaining so now? So that I will say something more to you. I said: 'Let's meet again.' Maybe I will tell [more]. Now I will give you only these two items because we have made a deal. I will tell you about these two cases. Let's meet again, if you insist. I understand that you want more. Well, I will think a bit about what I know.

Case Officer: That's all right.

NOSENKO: We can meet when I am abroad perhaps...You must understand me. This has not come to me simply. I had time to think for a long time. I thought for a long time. You see, it's very difficult for me, very difficult for me. And after I go it will also be very difficult for me.

Case Officer: But you knew that when you came. Why did you come to us? Why to the American rezidentura [CIA Station] and not to the British?

NOSENKO: I came here because you are strong, strong... You don't have to explain to me. I know what makes me go. I told you it is hard for me. I still need to think. That's all. But I can no longer take a step back because the step forward has already been taken. I won't refuse if we meet before my departure. If you like, on Monday, on Tuesday, any day. Monday is better for me. Not Sunday, because I have to be there with my own [people].

This exchange was followed by a lengthy description of the two leads which NOSENKO had come to sell, the BELITSKIY and the "ANDREY" cases.

As NOSENKO was about to leave this first meeting, his case officer asked when they might meet again. NOSENKO suggested that they meet two days later, on Monday, around noontime as it would be easier for him to get away unnoticed at lunchtime. He then said that the case officer was probably trying to get everything down on tape and asked that this be stopped because of the risk to his security resulting from such a permanent record of their conversations. NOSENKO said: "I will not tell you anything particularly interesting. But I can tell you something. But not today. I can tell how LANGELLE blew POPOV--not LANGELLE, but because of whom and why we found him--for your future use, so that you will know how to operate. But LANGELLE was not guilty. It was not LANGELLE who was guilty. Another person was responsible for the compromise. Next time."

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or of the degree of this cooperation was never raise aga n. At the very start of the second meeting, on 11 June, he said: "I am tortured all the time by a single thought. Everything now depends upon you, only on you. The slightest careless move by your people and it will be the end of me." Although he sometimes voiced moral compunctions, from this point on NOSENKO expressed his primary personal concern as being his own security vis-a-vis the KGB.

b. Attitude Toward Defection

While willing to meet with CIA representatives during future trips outside the Soviet Union, which he estimated would occur about once a year, NOSENKO in 1962 refused to consider defection except in circumstances where his personal security would be endangered. His devotion to his wife and children and the probability that the KGB would take reprisals against them if he fled were, he said, the primary considerations behind this refusal. (Without elaborating on the reasons, NOSENKO said on another occasion that he would not want to leave the USSR even on a permanent KGB assignment and accompanied by his family.) Other considerations included his widowed mother's dependence on him and his love of Russia and the Russian people, as opposed to the regime. For these reasons, NOSENKO said, he could not defect as PETROV, GOLITSYN, and KHOKLOV had done.

c. Motivation

NOSENKO told David MARK on 9 June 1962 that he wanted to contact American Intelligence because he was in trouble over the loss of KGB operational funds, for which he had to account prior to his imminent departure for the Soviet Union. His KGB career would be ruined if he was caught misusing this money, NOSENKO added, and because he had nowhere else to turn, he was willing to sell two items of information to MARK. The amount needed to cover the loss was 900 Swiss francs, or about $210, and this was the price asked for the information.

NOSENKO's statements of motivation to his CIA case officers during subsequent meetings are given below:

9 June 1962: In his first meeting with a CIA officer NOSENKO asked whether MARK had relayed the reasons why he wanted to meet with American Intelligence. He then very briefly repeated what he had told MARK concerning the loss of his operational funds. The case officer remarked that there must be something more to it, upon which NOSENKO said that this was not, in fact, his main motivation: "I have been working in this business for a long time and I know what I am doing. I have heard more than is written [in the newspapers]. A reorganization has been started in the USSR. In short, they have begun to do away with the ministries and the sovnarkhozy. But this is premature. Right now our agriculture is falling apart at the seams and our industry is at the point of collapse because this reorganization, this innovation, is too early. And this is not just me, a young man, talking. I mingle with ministers, with my father's friends, and I hear what they are saying. And how much does a worker earn? 600-800 rubles in old money, now 60-80. And he doesn't sense any improvement [in his position] within the total population. These are empty words only. We have exceeded the United States in per capita production of butter and milk. But how can it be said that we have surpassed you when they are

now raising the prices for butter? You know, you feel this internal resentment (nadlom), and you feel that some big mistakes have been permitted, that management as a whole is somehow off on the wrong track. Also, look at the serious situation in Czechoslovakia now, in Germany--in the GDR. It is very serious. In Poland they have just had a poor harvest. Everywhere there they have had floods. These rains are also very serious. It means that the system, the whole socialist system cannot [cope?--one word on the tape cannot be distinguished here]. Do you understand what is wrong? Faith in the future is being lost. Why have I told you this? Because under other circumstances perhaps I would not have come to this. So this is the reason for what has happened to me. This is perhaps the incident that drove me into contact with you. It all somehow grew within me. God knows."

11 June 1962: During the second meeting, NOSENKO himself raised the issue of motivation. His case officer had just said that CIA would respect his wishes in connection with a particular request when NOSENKO said: "Speaking of respect, how can there be respect? I don't even respect myself for what I have done. But, but, take the press bulletin, the communique of the Summit Conference in Moscow on various questions. Again lies, lies, lies, to show that we have had great successes. I can't see them [the successes]. No, excuse me, I know somewhat more than the rank and file Soviet man because I work under this system. I can see what is being done and what is not being done. Lies, more lies. This was my mood. I say, 'How much is it possible to deceive the people, the Soviet people? How far can you go?' Our people are very poor. It is somewhat difficult to arouse a people such as this. If we stir ourselves up we will know how to stand up for ourselves. But I feel for my people. How often can you say that things will be good; how often can you say that we have achieved big successes? Where are they? Show me them. I can see no trace of them. This is what I say...that there is resentment in my soul. Do you understand? A terrible resentment. I love my country. You may say that this is nothing. But I tell you that I cannot act like GOLITSYN, like KHOKLOV, like PETROV, because I want to be there. I want to be with my family. That's all. But I feel that not only the government is making mistakes. I feel that there are faults throughout the entire system of socialism. What I mean is that things are bad in Czechoslovakia, things are bad in Poland, things are bad with KADAR [in Hungary], they are starving in China. This means that there are great mistakes. Well, that's all. What did you want to ask me, please?"

At the close of this meeting, NOSENKO stressed that money was unimportant as a motive for a continuing relationship: "My name must not be used anywhere, even in your offices. Understand? It would be the end of me. I am not afraid of this. The devil with them. Because I have had such a life. I lost my father, everything. Why do I say this? I did not come to you simply because I needed money. I don't need it. I came because I am resentful inside. Do you understand this internal resentment? I do not believe in what is being done. I do not believe in this. Listen to me. Let me speak honestly. Have I not had the chance to live as a person should? My father was a big man. He had a dacha and a state-owned automobile. I have my own Volga [automobile]. My mother was given a dacha for life. It's luxurious. Her apartment is enormous--150 square meters. For America this is nothing, but for Moscow this is enormous. We

always had a lot of money, especially during the war. A salary of 15,000 or 20,000-plus--25,000. There was much money. She is a rich woman. She has paintings by Ayvazovskiy, Makovskiy. Even if she had insufficient money, she could always sell her possessions. What do I want to say? That I've never wanted for money. Never...As I said, perhaps the thing which drove me to you was not money, but this great, great resentment."

14 June 1962: The subject of motivation was not discussed during the third and fourth meetings with NOSENKO. As he was about to leave the Geneva safehouse after the fifth and final session, however, NOSENKO again touched on the economic inequities existing inside the Soviet Union and raised a new reason for cooperating with CIA, his basic sympathy for the American people. NOSENKO said that he realized that the reason he had given for coming to us, his need for money, was "not good." Before he and his case officers parted, NOSENKO said, he wanted to emphasize "without attempting to justify himself" that he had "always felt a certain sympathy toward the American people." He explained that it was not the technical progress of the United States which attracted him, nor was it the high standard of living of the American people. It was rather the openness and directness with which the Americans whom he had met and seen handled themselves. As examples he cited his American targets in Moscow and Secretary of State Dean RUSK, whom he had seen in Geneva.

Although NOSENKO did mention the difficult economic situation in the USSR on a few other occasions, he did not relate these remarks specifically to his motives for volunteering to CIA. The above excerpts are representative of his total statement on motivation during the 1962 meetings.

3. Decision to Defect (January 1964)

On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the second Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that after long and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting series, he had decided to defect. He once again criticized the Communist regime along the same lines as during earlier meetings, but his immediate motivation seemed to have nothing to do with this. NOSENKO explained that he had recently been promoted to the position of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh (Tourist) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and that because of the stature and responsibilities of his new job, there would be few opportunities, if any, for him to visit the West in the future. Therefore, he had decided to seize the opportunity at hand and to flee to the United States at once, leaving his family behind. He foresaw no possibility of his wife and children being permitted to leave the USSR for the "next twenty years." NOSENKO told CIA that "the hardest thing is to part with my family." He had, however, carefully considered their fate as the close relatives of a defector, and he knew that, because of his mother's position in Soviet society, no harm would come to them.

Whereas NOSENKO declared his intent to defect immediately, the CIA case officers at this first meeting in 1964 persuaded him to remain in place for at least two or three weeks on the grounds that, first, CIA would benefit much from this, and second, arrangements for his transfer to and reception in the United States would have to be coordinated in advance with CIA Headquarters.

During this first meeting NOSENKO made no monetary request of CIA and asked only for reasonable assurance of a secure future in the United States. In this connection, he said, he would prefer to act as a CIA consultant, particularly on counterintelligence matters because he was a specialist in this field; he would be able to give CIA leads and assistance in spotting and recruiting other Soviets.

The next five meetings with NOSENKO were devoted exclusively to debriefings on the activities of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. Although his impending defection was mentioned, his reasons for taking this step were not discussed. In the meantime, NOSENKO's first CIA handler flew to Washington for discussions regarding the defection and, on his return, told NOSENKO that the CIA leadership had asked why, specifically, NOSENKO had decided to come to the United States at that time. The answer was that NOSENKO, "after coming back and seeing that there was no more chance to come to the West, or little more chance," felt that this was his one opportunity to come and make his life with the Americans. Therefore, he was going to seize the opportunity while he had it. Asked about this, NOSENKO confirmed that this was his reason, and added: "I may never have another chance, and in addition, I've had sufficient time since our last meeting here in Geneva [1962] to weigh everything and to consider everything." Later in this same meeting, NOSENKO again mentioned his lack of interest in money and his feelings about deserting his family: "I understand [that it will be difficult to adjust to a new life in America] and know that for some time I will be sick within. And I know that a certain period of time must elapse before this can heal. I even spoke to you bluntly about my [financial] security. I am absolutely unmercenary and have never had any appreciation for money or wealth...My most difficult and sorest spot of all is my family. This is the most basic and most difficult spot of all. And I know perfectly well that I must go through an illness over this. For this the only and the best doctor is time. I don't expect to have a new family there. Of course, I don't know--but at least I'm speaking from the way I feel now. I have a strong liking for children--not only for my own, but for all children and, losing my own, I am fully conscious how I must suffer through this. In time I will get used to it. I know one can get used to almost anything."

At this meeting, NOSENKO agreed to remain in place for approximately another week, and the tentative date of 8 February was selected for the defection.

NOSENKO's motives for the defection were not mentioned for five more meetings. Then, on 4 February 1964, he telephoned the Geneva safehouse to say he wanted to defect at once. Arriving shortly thereafter, he announced that he had been ordered to return to Moscow the following day and, therefore, had to leave Switzerland before morning. He stated his reasons formally in an asylum request, written at the time:

> "This decision was made by me, not now, at the moment I write this request, but several years ago. Having worked for many years in the KGB and knowing more than the average Soviet citizen about the policy of the Soviet government, about the direction which this government has chosen to take, and about the law and order in the USSR, I have come to the decision that

live in this country and work for the welfare of this government."

4. The Letter of July 1964

The most complete explanation given by NOSENKO of his motives for first contacting CIA and later defecting to the United States is contained in a letter to his CIA case officer in July 1964. He described this letter as "an exposition of all those reasons and root causes which led to the decision to leave the Soviet Union" and further explained that "everything put down here is lacking in a whole series of lesser details which to a greater or lesser degree played their role." Nevertheless, he said, he had tried in this letter "to set down the main things to show how, when, and why the decision was born, grew, and hardened within me to completely alter the course of my life." This letter is presented below in its entirety. Most of the biographical and operational details mentioned in the letter are covered separately in other parts of this paper.

"1. My life, my childhood and youth passed in very comfortable circumstances since the position of my father gave us the opportunity to live without lacking for anything. And the only difficult periods of my life (before the death of my father) were: study in the naval schools in Kuybyshev, Baku and Leningrad; and the beginning of my working life, the period in the Far East (1950-1952). The opportunity to be always well-dressed, to have a sufficient amount of money, to have my own car, to be able to use the car given me by my family and also my father's car, the opportunity to travel to the South and to vacation in the best sanitariums, dachas, and so forth; all this unquestionably left its mark on me and became something of a habit. After the death of my father, my successful progress in my work gave me a higher salary, and although I did not have all that which I had while my father was alive, still I did not experience any serious difficulties. But already I wanted to live still better.

"2. Up to 1953, over the course of my entire life--at school, in the Institute, at work, at home in the family--it was always pounded into my head that STALIN was a great genius, that he was good, keen, etc., and the thought never occurred to me to question his words or his deeds because everything that he said, and everything he did, were completely axiomatic. The arrests and trials only involved traitors and it was considered and explained that the people who suffered innocently, especially in 1937 and 1938, suffered only because at the head of the NKVD in 1937, 1938, was the betrayor of the people YEZHOV. Not even the shadow of doubt fell on the name of STALIN. Soon after STALIN's death in 1953 I read a certain document given me by my father. This was a secret letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 'case of the doctors;' it was not addressed to all communists but only to members and candidate members of the Central Committee. I was deeply shaken by this letter which described in detail how these people,

important specialists in the field of medicine, were brought to such a condition that they condemned themselves; that is, they confessed to things which had never happened, to things which they had never done. They were simply forced to give the evidence which was needed by the investigators. The secret letters on the cult of STALIN and much that I heard in the KGB about the reign of STALIN, all this left its mark and forced me to think deeply about the real truth and to look at everything more critically. Already I no longer had faith in all those ideas which for years had been pressed into my head.

"3. The new leaders (KHRUSHCHEV and Company) used the same methods but already diluted with the water of democracy, with playing up to the people and attempts to convince them that a new era would arise, a new and better life, and that now the Party was always going to concern itself with the welfare of the people. In fact, it was a struggle for power and the use of all means in this struggle, even microphones (they listened to the conversations of BERIYA and his friends; later they listened to the conversations of MOLOTOV, MALENKOV, KAGANOVICH, and others). KHRUSHCHEV's endless blabbing about successes, when in fact they didn't exist, the figures about how the USSR had passed the USA in the production of butter and milk, when in the stores they were available only infrequently. The endless promises of a better life when in fact nothing of the sort is taking place. All this similarly forced me to re-evaluate not only the events which were taking place in the country, but already the entire ideology of the Party, its external and internal course.

"4. The events in Novocherkassk where about 20,000 to 25,000 people rose up and the way in which this popular indignation was suppressed by troops with many casualties. This also made a deep impression on me. When I was resting in the summer of 1961 in Nikolayev, from my relatives--my father's brothers--I understood well the real relation of the workers both to the leadership and to the Party as a whole. At the same time I saw how the workers really lived, how they eat, what they have and what they can buy with their wages.

"5. I heard a great deal from my father about the domestic policies of KHRUSHCHEV in regard to the development and the course of construction in industry, about his complete illiteracy in engineering technology and industrial economics, about incorrect decisions in regard to many industries, and this was not only the opinion of my father, but also of other important leaders in various fields of industry (MALYSHEV, VANNIKOV, AKOPOV, and others). But no one dared to open his mouth and when in December 1955 my father tried, as an engineer, to prove that a certain decision would be incorrect, he received such a rebuff from KHRUSHCHEV that he was profoundly shaken and in the opinion of my mother this brought him to his illness in 1956 and his death in August 1956.

"6. The events in Germany and especially in Hungary showed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy of communist ideology. What was especially important for me was the fact that in these countries it was a protest not of individuals or groups, but of the entire people who could no longer endure a regime imposed on them by force. Here it is necessary to emphasize that the life of the people in these countries was much better than that of the people in the USSR (I saw for myself how people live in Czechoslovakia, in Germany, and beyond any doubt they live better than the entire people of the Soviet Union).

"7. The split of the international communist movement became for me a clear fact and confirmed my opinion that the theory of communism is a theory built on sand and that it is practiced according to the needs of the leadership of the Party at a given stage of life and that in reality full material welfare would never be enjoyed by the people but only by the leadership and the Party and the government.

"8. Working in the KGB I came to understand much and became conscious of the contradiction between the internal and external course of the USSR. Such questions as disarmament, the ban on atomic weapons, the position of the USSR in the United Nations--all these are used only in the interest of propaganda and as a screen for carrying out of the policies needed by the communist party. (I was myself present at the negotiations in Geneva and saw the 'politics' of the Soviet delegation.)

"9. My trips abroad opened my eyes wide to the true reality. With my own eyes, I saw how people live, how much they earn, how they can dress and live on their wages, and I paid special attention to the life of ordinary people and not to that of scientists, engineers, etc. And all the propaganda about the enormous armies of unemployed in the countries of the West, about the 'heavy exploitation', and the 'unbelievably difficult life' flew immediately out of my head. And that which I met with in my work, the sending of Soviet citizens abroad--who gets sent where and how, etc.--this finally debunked this propaganda. Many of my acquaintances--GUK, CHURANOV and others--think back with great pleasure about life abroad.

"10. I entered the KOMSOMOL completely without thinking about it. The time came, the right age, and I became a Komsomolnik like all the others. It was different in regards to the Party: I joined the Party in 1956 after the death of STALIN and while I was working in the KGB and already at that time there was a lack of faith and indecisiveness in me. My father continually insisted on this, saying that without the Party I would never move ahead and would not have success in life. But I myself understood and saw that I would not be able to work in the KGB unless I was a member of the Party. And if I worked somewhere else, I would truly never move ahead in my career

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unless I entered the Party. But from the very beginning of my entry into the Party, I deeply hated all the Party talmudism and dogmatism. All the Party meetings were literally a torture. Especially when I became the deputy chief of the section, the chief of the section, and the deputy chief of the department, because then I had to speak at these meetings. Because this meant to lie, to twist my soul, and to attempt to show myself as deeply dedicated to the Party and its course.

"11. In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks became worse. The question of a change of climate was raised. At that time the SCD needed to send an officer to Ethiopia for two to three years to conduct counterintelligence work among the Soviet specialists there. It cost me a great deal of effort to personally talk GRIBANOV into letting me go. The Party and work references had been confirmed, all the questionnaries were already filled out, the photos had been submitted; that is, all the formalities had been accomplished. But at the very last moment the Central Personnel of the KGB began to protest against my going with my family to Ethiopia. The reason for this was that from the house check made at my place of residence they received information that I sometimes came home in a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels with my wife. A tour abroad with my family was necessary because of the health of my daughter (since 1963 the illness has become better) and also it would have been advantageous from the financial point of view. From this time on I understood that Personnel would not let me go abroad with my family.

"12. Knowing many officers in the FCD, I began to understand that being sent abroad is entirely determined, not by knowledge, experience in work and success, but only by the absolute 'cleanliness' of the person's autobiography and complete assurance as to his limitless dedication to the Party and the government. But not only being sent abroad but the assignment of personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorates and the entire KGB depends on the reasons indicated by me and also on good relations with the leadership and good connections with workers in Central Personnel.

"13. I lived about 11 years with my wife and our life was not a hell. It is true that there were quarrels and basically they boiled down to the fact that she took an extremely unfavorable attitude towards my delays at work and also when I would be delayed with some of my friends and acquaintances after work and would come home with a few drinks under my belt. Of course, I loved and love my children and only the fact that they are taken care of financially until they grow up and have received an education to some extent consoled me in taking the decision to leave the USSR. What do I have in mind when I speak of financial security? After the death of my father, the family received a large monetary allowance, plus the money

that my mother had saved and valuable property, etc. My mother many times offered to divide all this in three parts: for me, my brother, and for her, but I suggested that we not do this before her death. And, of course, my mother will not leave my children without attention, and my share of the property and the money will be given to my children.

"14. If the defections of PETROV, RASTVOROV and DERYABIN passed without evoking any particular thoughts, the defection to the United States of GOLITSYN, whom I had heard of as an intelligent person and a capable officer, undoubtedly caused me to think very deeply. Because to act thus, it is necessary to have not only boldness and decisiveness, but also great strength of will. And already I put to myself the question, will I be able to act thus in view of the dissatisfactions and disillusionments which had accumulated inside of me?

"15. Being in Geneva in 1962, not long before my departure I myself of my own desire entered into contact with you. The reason for this was the loss of money received by me for operational expenses. I would have been unable to accumulate such a sum of money before my departure and there was nobody to borrow from (at this time GUK was himself in financial difficulty and at the same time he was already preparing for his return home). To tell the truth about the loss of the money would have meant that it would be necessary to explain where and in what circumstances it had been lost. This would have risked expulsion from the KGB and a serious reprimand from the Party. Not to tell the truth, to think up some sort of a story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of all, they might think that I had appropriated the money, that is, stolen it. And this would be for me the worst of all and I would, of course, in such event have told the truth.

"16. To tell the truth, it was only after my return home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not immediately, began fully to realize all the seriousness of my contact with you and its full meaning. And although I did not give you any promises or assurances about our continued contact in the future, I understood that you sooner or later would set yourself the task of continuing our contact. And here it was that weighing up all the reasons and causes which I have indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself the decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity and that I started to work towards being sent on a trip abroad.

"17. Of course, I wanted to come abroad with some sort of 'baggage', that is, with materials which could be useful and necessary for you. In this entire period up to January 1964 I tried to collect information which would be of the maximum value for you. My assignment to the position of deputy chief of the Seventh Department in July 1962 gave me a greater opportunity than before. But at the same time this assignment almost

excluded the possibility of a trip abroad and it was only with great difficulty that I was able to get away for the trip in January 1964. It was necessary to convince CHELNOKOV and then to ask CHELNOKOV to convince BOBKOV and in 1963 to convince KOVALENKO. In this I advanced many reasons: that I had not spent all the money (in foreign currency); that the medicine which I bought for my daughter had proven very successful and that I needed to buy some more medicine to carry out one more series of treatments; that this trip would not be a long one and that since I was already the deputy chief of the Department I would not be able to travel abroad any more and so, therefore, this trip would probably be my last. Of course, all this was said at convenient moments and outside of work. Things were easier with the Eleventh Department (which deals with trips abroad) because I was on good terms with PENCHENKO who covered Switzerland, besides which when I came back from Geneva in 1962 I had brought him a number of presents.

"18. The publication in 1963 by the foreign press of the VASSALL case put me on my guard since in the newspaper Times it said outright that the English learned about him thanks to the Americans who learned about VASSALL in the spring of 1962. Fortunately, the leadership of the FCD, as I learned from GUK, CHURANOV, and TARABRIN, came to the conclusion that here the Americans had been helped by GOLITSYN. But at the same time the FCD was not completely sure of this. But the publication in the American press of Alsop's articles on the CIA alarmed me extremely. This article in one spot said plainly that as far as is known the KGB does not have any sources in the CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB. From this moment, I do not conceal this fact, I began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my contact with you. This article deeply 'interested' the KGB.

"19. During the closed trial of PENKOVSKIY I got a pass in the Second Department and went in order to look at him myself. For sometimes it is enough to simply look at a man, to see how he holds himself and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort of an initial opinion of him. Personally, I liked how PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial; I liked his appearance and I understood that everything which had been said in the KGB about him and the sort of person they were trying to make him out to be (that he was morally degraded, that he had descended and sunk into a swamp) that all this was nonsense, bluff, and chatter. And PENKOVSKIY, the same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling of greater confidence in the correctness of the decision taken by me to leave the Soviet Union.

26 July 1964 Signed: Yu. NOSENKO"

D. NOSENKO's Activities in Geneva

1. Introduction

The extent to which NOSENKO made himself available for meetings with CIA in Geneva in 1962 and 1964 is reviewed here in connection with his statements about the KGB duties assigned to him for these trips, his visits to the KGB Legal Residency, and his personal association with other Soviets. Although NOSENKO was not precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, he did indicate that he was his own boss, disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. At the first meeting with CIA in 1962 he accounted for his freedom of movement by saying: "I can come and go as I please at any time. (Ambassador) ZORIN knows who I am, almost the entire delegation knows who I am, because I don't need to pretend. Nobody pays any attention to me. They know that I am not a Ministry of Foreign Affairs man (at the conference sessions). I sit, listen, leaf through some papers. For this reason I can leave the conference at any time, or I do not come at all, and no one will say a word to me." CIA made no attempt to place NOSENKO under surveillance in 1962 and 1964, and there is no evidence from other sources confirming or disproving NOSENKO's statements about his activities while away from the CIA safehouse.

2. Official Duties in Geneva

In 1962 NOSENKO said he was the sole KGB officer in the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation.* To assist him in carrying out these security officer functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. In addition, NOSENKO had the specific mission of checking on suspicions attached to one of the delegation members, P. F. SHAKHOV,** but by the time he established contact with CIA, he said, this assignment had already been completed.

In 1964, NOSENKO said his only operational task then was to handle the general security responsibilities for the Soviet delegation, as he had done in 1962. There was no specific mission such as the one concerning SHAKHOV in 1962.

NOSENKO has described his investigations of SHAKHOV, but he has never indicated either that he conducted security checks of other delegation members in 1962 and 1964, or that he received any security-type information (except on SHAKHOV) from the KGB cooptees who were supposed to be reporting to him. Likewise, NOSENKO has not said that he prepared communications for KGB Headquarters regarding his clandestine assignments in Geneva.

3. Visits to the KGB Legal Residency

Virtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for more than a day or two, the Legal Resident, S. I. GAVRICHEV, would invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself.

* I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL also arrived with the delegation in March 1962 but had left Geneva by the time NOSENKO contacted CIA.

** SHAKHOV is discussed further in Part III.3.1.

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GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated him with deference, and shortly after his arrival in Geneva in March 1962, NOSENKO gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled members of the Legal Residency. This lecture was given at GAVRICHEV's request, although it was only after some hesitation on the part of the Legal Resident that all of his subordinates were brought together to hear NOSENKO. (In return for helping the Legal Residency to perform counter-surveillance on several occasions, NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed by GAVRICHEV to have the use of an operational car and driver to go shopping and carry out other private errands.)

Similarly, in 1964, NOSENKO said he was making nearly daily visits to the Legal Residency. During the 1964 meetings NOSENKO stated that it was his close relationship with M.S. TSYMBAL* which made it possible for him to have visited the Geneva Legal Residency so frequently, both in 1962 and 1964. "According to the strict rules," NOSENKO told CIA, "an officer in a status such as mine should not even go to the Residency. In this case it is only because I am deputy chief of a department and GAVRICHEV knows my position perfectly well (it is not lower than his), and because I have such a sympathetic personal relationship with TSYMBAL." He then went on to say that TSYMBAL "sort of escorted me to the Residency. They could have simply said: 'You are here on a mission, we have our own mission, and we have nothing in common.'" But, NOSENKO indicated, this was not the case, thanks to TSYMBAL's intervention.

4. Association with TSYMBAL

At the second meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO volunteered information on TSYMBAL's KGB background and his current missions in Geneva, then alluded to his having spoken with TSYMBAL in Geneva but without placing any particular emphasis on this relationship.

In 1964, however, NOSENKO claimed that their relationship was close, explained that it was TSYMBAL (again in Geneva at the same time) who gained NOSENKO's admission to the Legal Residency, and said that he had twice gone to see TSYMBAL off on train trips, once on 24 January when TSYMBAL went to Bern and again on 28 January when TSYMBAL left Lausanne for Rome. NOSENKO told CIA he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961. At that time "We were looking over some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special (Illegals) Directorate...Then when we came (here) in 1962 for the Disarmament Conference, I got to know him a little better - more from the human side. He seemed to take a liking to me for some reason. We had met in Moscow before, of course, but just in the hall or in the dining room. He used to say: 'Stop in and see me,' and I would answer: 'Well, it's kind of awkward for me to hang around the Special Directorate - what am I supposed to be doing here?' He would say: 'Oh, come on, stop in.' But I

* TSYMBAL appeared in Geneva under the last-name alias "ROGOV" and was identified by NOSENKO as Chief of the Illegals Directorate, KGB First Chief Directorate. Since 1956, TSYMBAL was known by CIA to be the true name for ROGOV, and GOLITSYN reported in 1961 that TSYMBAL was Chief of the European Department, KGB First Chief Directorate.

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didn't." NOSENKO also said that TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and had suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In fact, NOSENKO added, he had got into some difficulty with O. M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, by virtue of TSYMBAL's efforts in 1962 to have NOSENKO transferred and his leaving the impression with GRIBANOV that NOSENKO (who was still in Geneva) had agreed to this action.

Questioned in April 1964 about his association with TSYMBAL, NOSENKO stated that he met TSYMBAL for the first time several days before their departure for Geneva. Besides saying again that he saw TSYMBAL almost daily at the Legal Residency and that TSYMBAL's assistance enabled him to enter the Legal Residency, NOSENKO reported that in 1962 he went out with TSYMBAL several times a week to eat lunch or dinner; sometimes they were joined by I. S. MAYOROV,* sometimes by A. K. KISLOV (see next section), and sometimes the two ate alone. During the 1966 interrogations, NOSENKO said that, while he had seen TSYMBAL on a daily basis in 1962, he saw him only twice in 1964: once when TSYMBAL travelled to Geneva from Bern for one or two days and later when NOSENKO saw TSYMBAL off for Rome from Lausanne.

5. Association with Other Soviets

NOSENKO said in 1962 that the other Soviets he saw most often were A. K. KISLOV and Yu. I. GUK.** KISLOV, with NOSENKO was one of the four members of the Soviet delegation staying at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva, and was said to be head of the American Section of TASS and a genuine correspondent.*** During the 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO reported that KISLOV was not a KGB officer and made no reference of his having any affiliation with the KGB. NOSENKO did say, however, that he had arranged for KISLOV's name to be given the KGB double agent B. Ye. BELITSKIY**** to use as a notional source of information on Soviet disarmament policy; BELITSKIY was to pass this information to his CIA contacts. NOSENKO made numerous references to drinking and carousing with KISLOV, specifically with regard to a night in early June - when NOSENKO was robbed of or squandered his operational funds, which brought him to CIA - and on the night of 10 June 1962 when NOSENKO squandered 2000 Swiss francs (the money CIA had given him) on wine and women.***** In giving NOSENKO the money to defray these personal expenses, the CIA handlers expressed to him their concern over the dangers to his security arising from KISLOV's knowledge of this inexplicable source of income. NOSENKO replied that there was no need to be concerned since KISLOV was "too drunk to know what is going on," and in any event he constituted no threat.

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* MAYOROV, according to NOSENKO, was visiting Geneva in order to have operational meetings with agents.

** Both KISLOV and GUK are mentioned in the discussion of the "ANDREY" case (see Part VI.D.3.b.). GUK was also a friend of GOLITSYN, who reported extensively on GUK's career in the KGB including his service in the United States.

*** In October 1966 NOSENKO named all the Soviets living at the Ariane, without mentioning KISLOV.

**** The BELITSKIY case is discussed in greater length in Part VI.D.6.

*****See Parts II.B. and II.C.2.c.

In 1964 NOSENKO confirmed that he had spent much time with KISLOV in Geneva two years before and that they had become very friendly. For the first time, NOSENKO reported that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact while in the United States, that he had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to his departure for Geneva in 1962 in order to be able to exploit him during the Geneva Conference, and that after returning from Geneva KISLOV had been recruited as a KGB agent on the basis of a favorable report NOSENKO had prepared.

Often during the 1962 meetings NOSENKO spoke of his "big, big friend" GUK, whom he described as the Deputy Legal Resident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the KGB Legal Residency. He implied that his friendship with GUK, a former member of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, was of longstanding. NOSENKO related that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva. They often went out together to chat and have a few drinks, and as a consequence, NOSENKO was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations there. In 1964 NOSENKO told CIA he found it difficult to obtain information on the activities of the Geneva Legal Residency because he no longer had a good friend there like GUK, who had been reassigned to KGB Headquarters. When questioned later in 1964 about his relationship with GUK, NOSENKO said he had come to know GUK well only during his 1962 TDY in Geneva.

6. Availability for Meetings with CIA

In speaking to David MARK on 6 June 1962, NOSENKO expressed displeasure over MARK's insistence on deferring their luncheon (at which NOSENKO sought contact with American Intelligence) until three days later. When the first meeting with CIA did take place on 9 June 1962, NOSENKO stayed for three hours, and it was at his suggestion that another meeting was scheduled for 11 June. This second meeting in 1962 lasted seven hours. NOSENKO remained in Geneva until 15 June, and in the interim he met CIA officers three more times for over seven hours altogether. He offered to meet again on the day of his departure, but this proposal was rejected as needlessly endangering his security.

From the first 1964 meeting on 23 January to his defection on 4 February, NOSENKO was met a total of 13 times, the sessions lasting for five or six hours. He was able to come to the CIA safehouse every day but one, and this opportunity was skipped at the request of the CIA handlers. By mutual consent, most of the meetings started in the afternoon, but on two occasions NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours; several meetings went on until past midnight. NOSENKO appeared to be totally at the disposal of CIA, to be the master of his time, and to have no other demands for his attention except for the visits to the KGB Legal Residency, "looking in" on an occasional session of the Disarmament Conference, and attendance at a reception.

E. Timing of Defection

After telling CIA on 24 January 1964 of his decision to defect, NOSENKO at the same meeting concurred when CIA gave operational and administrative reasons for him to stay in place until the middle of February. During the week that followed, the date of the defection was moved up to 8 February in accordance with NOSENKO's wishes and with his reports indicating that less information of value would be forthcoming than CIA had at first thought. On 4 February, however, NOSENKO reported that he was being recalled to Moscow for a conference on foreign tourism in the USSR, and he therefore placed himself in CIA custody on that date.* Details on the timing of NOSENKO's defection are given in the following paragraphs.

At the 24 January meeting the CIA case officers agreed in principle with NOSENKO's decision to defect. NOSENKO felt that it would be best for him to disappear from Geneva without a trace, leaving all his personal possessions behind; he assumed that CIA could exfiltrate him from Switzerland to the United States. He wanted to carry out this plan as soon as possible, but the CIA officers encouraged him--and NOSENKO agreed--to remain in place for at least three weeks more. The reasons given NOSENKO for this request were:

- The desire to get information on the local KGB Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference while he still had access to this information;

- The value of having NOSENKO present when O.M. GRIBANOV made a visit to Geneva about 7 February a visit known to CIA only through NOSENKO;**

- The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO's in place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among the Soviet representation in Geneva;

- The necessity of making arrangements, acceptable to NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement.

The events which followed NOSENKO's agreement to remain in place for a short time longer are chronicled below:

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* The report of NOSENKO's recall to Moscow for the conference on tourism is discussed further in Part III.F.

** GRIBANOV was in 1964 the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate and, according to NOSENKO and other sources, the sponsor of NOSENKO's rapid rise in State Security. Several [redacted] sources, have reported that GRIBANOV was fired from the KGB as a result of NOSENKO's defection (Part III.I.). NOSENKO's relationship with GRIBANOV is discussed in Part V.H.

26 January 1964: In a three-and-a-half hour meeting, NOSENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was necessary and useful for him to remain in place until the GRIBANOV visit to Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as possible thereafter.

28 January 1964: NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might not be coming to Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman SEMICHASTNYY was apparently reluctant to permit him to travel beyond Vienna. NOSENKO said that he would probably have definite information on GRIBANOV's trip by the end of the week.

30 January 1964: At the seventh meeting of the series, NOSENKO said that there now appeared to be little likelihood that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris.* Therefore, he wanted to defect right away. As reasons he cited the emotional strain of any further delay and the fact that he and his case officers were wasting their time working against the local KGB Legal Residency, which had no worthwhile or promising targets. He also felt that nothing of value could be obtained from the Soviet delegation because "TSARAPKIN himself doesn't know what he will say until he is told by Moscow the day before." The CIA handlers, however, delayed the defection for one week by obtaining NOSENKO's agreement to assist in an audio operation: CIA proposed to install listening devices in the offices of the KGB Legal Residency, and NOSENKO said he would check certain physical aspects of the delegation buildings. As the best time for the defection, he suggested Saturday morning, 8 February, because he probably would not be missed until the following Monday. This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSENKO again repeated his desire simply to "disappear without a trace." He also asked about exfiltration plans.

31 January 1964: NOSENKO reported the results of his reconnaissance of the KGB Legal Residency in connection with the proposed audio operation, which would involve microphone transmitters operating on a carrier current. He told CIA he had accidentally overheard in the Residency that the building used its own batteries and generator, and therefore the scheme would not work. He repeated his willingness to remain in place until the arrival of the CHEREPANOV Papers**, which he was told were enroute from Washington. He explained that he had felt pressure at the previous meeting because of an imminent move by the delegation from its hotel to the Soviet villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappearance would be noticed more quickly. This move, he had now learned, had been postponed pending the arrival of a housekeeping officer from Moscow.

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* From 7 to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where he was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by NOSENKO as a KGB counterintelligence officer. There is no evidence that he visited Switzerland.

** See Part VI.D.7.c for further details on CHEREPANOV.

[redacted]

1 February 1964: At NOSENKO's request, it was firmly agreed that the defection would take place in the morning of 8 February. NOSENKO said that he assumed that exfiltration would be by automobile to West Germany and thence by plane to the United States.* His case officers confirmed that this was correct.

3 February 1964: NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV materials. The defection was still scheduled for Saturday, 8 February.

4 February 1964: NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse from his hotel room in the early afternoon and said: "I want to come now and not go back." After arriving he explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legal Residency following the morning session of the Disarmament Conference, he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscow immediately to prepare for a KGB conference on foreign tourism in the Soviet Union.** The residency was arranging for a ticket for NOSENKO to fly to Moscow via Paris the following day, and a replacement was being readied to assume NOSENKO's duties as security officer for the Soviet Delegation in Geneva; he was not told who the replacement would be. Before he had left for Geneva in January, NOSENKO then related, the Soviet Government had been deliberating the question of expanding foreign tourism in the USSR and had agreed to open a number of new cities and tourist itineraries in this connection. SEMICHASTNYY had now decided that it was time to call a conference to discuss new "tactics and strategies" for handling the increased number of tourists expected. Since NOSENKO had been placed in charge of the entire conference, he was directed to leave at once to prepare a basic report on the KGB handling of tourists; the report would be read to the conference either by himself or by someone from the leadership of the KGB or the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO explained that he was the only one who could do this job as Lt. Col. A.G. KOVALENKO, the KGB Headquarters Department senior officer, was a relatively new man in this line of operations, having been there only four or five years, perhaps less. NOSENKO also told CIA that "by great coincidence" he had learned, just before the cable arrived, he was being moved to the Soviet villa on the morning of 5 February. He had arranged for a Soviet chauffeur to bring a car around at 0930 hours the next morning for the move. His absence would be noted at that time, and therefore "the main thing is to cross the Swiss border before morning." NOSENKO felt, however, that there would be considerable confusion among the Soviets in Geneva for a time following his disappearance, and that there would be no real concern until the evening. To foster Soviet uncertainty he had left his clothing lying around his hotel room and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safehouse. NOSENKO estimated the first Soviet queries to Swiss

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* [redacted]

** See Part III.F.

authorities would probably be made late on 5 February or early on the 6th.

NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February and remained in a safehouse there until 11 February, when press publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for an immediate interview with NOSENKO prompted the Director of Central Intelligence to order that he be brought to Washington as soon as possible. He arrived in the evening of 12 February.

F. The Recall Telegram

On arriving at the safehouse at 1515 on 4 February 1964 NOSENKO related that on the preceding day, 3 February, he had been to the KGB Legal Residency during the day and again in the evening. (He had met with CIA from 1200 to 1800 hours on 3 February.) He related that as of that time "everything was quiet and peaceful," and he received four personal letters from Moscow. NOSENKO said that on the morning of 4 February he had again stopped in at the Residency, but "nothing was going on." Later in the morning, however, after attending a session of the Disarmament Conference, NOSENKO learned that the coded telegram described above had arrived from Moscow ordering him to return immediately to Moscow to participate in the KGB conference on tourism.

[redacted]

Special intelligence indicates, however, that no cable traffic at all was sent from Moscow to Geneva from the late afternoon of 3 February 1964 until the morning of 5 February, the day after the defection. (Two priority cables of unusual length, 247 and 207 groups, were transmitted to Geneva at 1901 and 1915 hours Greenwich time on 3 February; there was no traffic on 4 February; and the next message passed was a routine cable originated by Moscow at 0755 hours on 5 February.)

On 26 October 1966, while being questioned about the circumstances of his defection, NOSENKO was asked about this telegram which recalled him to Moscow. NOSENKO said that there was no such telegram, and that he had invented it in order to defect as soon as possible because he was nervous and afraid his contacts with American Intelligence in Geneva might be noticed by Soviet authorities. After detailed questioning on this point, NOSENKO voluntarily signed a statement with the following wording.

"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in Geneva that a telegram from KGB Headquarters in Moscow

had been received in the KGB Residency in Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the time that this telegram said that I was recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that the story was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous and afraid that my contacts with American Intelligence might be noticed."

TOP SECRET

G. Soviet Official Reactions

The Chief of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon on 6 February 1964 that NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February; they speculated that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in a car accident.* Two more days passed without Soviet authorities making any additional public or private statements on the subject. Later events showing Soviet official reactions to NOSENKO's defection are presented below in chronological order:

8 February: A Soviet spokesman in Geneva reported to Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert" temporarily assigned to Geneva, had been missing for four days.

9 February: Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.

10 February: Unidentified Soviet sources were quoted in the press as having said it was presumed that he had defected.

A U. S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKO as a KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.

11 February: The Department of State was advised informally by Ambassador DOBRYNIN in Washington that a Soviet note to be delivered later would ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, request his release, and demand an immediate interview with him.

12 February: S. K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappearance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO.

The Soviet note predicted by DOBRYNIN was delivered to the State Department, and a noncommittal reply was given to

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* Apparently no effort was made to notify Moscow immediately. Special intelligence shows that no cable traffic was passed from Geneva to Moscow from 1630 hours on 3 February until 1900 hours on 7 February: at 1915 hours on the 7th, the Geneva Residency transmitted a short top priority cable to Moscow. Likewise, after one routine cable on 4 February, the Bern Residency sent no traffic to Moscow on 5 February. Seven cables, at least four of which were of routine precedence, were sent to Moscow on 6 February; thereafter there was no traffic from Bern to Moscow until the early morning of 10 February.

Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in order to obtain assurance that the defection had been voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as possible.

(NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours this same evening.)

13 February: NOSENKO said he had no objection to talking to the Swiss, but he would see the Soviets only if necessary.

14 February: In Moscow, Ambassador KOHLER was summoned to the office of Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO, who read him a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a "gross provocation by American Intelligance organs." GROMYKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.

The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy, Jean-Louis NATURAL, interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service late in the afternoon. The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled by Minister Counselor G. M. KORNIENKO, second to Ambassador DOBRYNIN at the Soviet Embassy, and Third Secretary V. F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. (ISAKOV had been a member of the Soviet Delegation to the 1962 Disarmament Conference in Geneva, where NOSENKO said he had first met him.) NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.

H. Reactions of NOSENKO's Family

Two women who said they were the mother and wife of NOSENKO called at the American Embassy in Moscow on five occasions between 24 February and 23 March 1964,* and NOSENKO, who on the basis of physical descriptions confirmed their identities, said he had no doubt that the KGB had directed them to do this in order to pressure him to return. The women expressed disbelief that NOSENKO had voluntarily betrayed his family and his country. They sought a personal meeting with him in the United States or anywhere else, submitted letters for him, and returned to the Embassy to ask whether he had replied; the younger Mrs. NOSENKO explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan her own future and that of the NOSENKO children.

NOSENKO proposed to respond to his family's letters by writing two of his own, one which would be intended for KGB consumption and the other for his wife alone. The first of these would state NOSENKO's irrevocable decision to remain in the United States and to sever all ties with his family and homeland. The second letter would be read by Mrs. NOSENKO in the Embassy, left there, and not reported to the KGB; in it he would express hope for a reunion, ask her to wait for him, and tell her to indicate her willingness to join him in the West by writing either "yes" or "no" on the letter itself. Although NOSNEKO prepared both letters, only the first was sent to his wife; it was mailed from Washington to the NOSENKO home in Moscow on 7 April 1964.

From March 1964 nothing was heard from NOSENKO's relatives until mid-1966, when Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV,** a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would

* Only once before had members of a defector's family called at a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in September 1963, his wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about him. KROTKOV, an admitted agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, is believed by MI-5 and CIA to remain under KGB control.

** CIA records show that KOROLEV was employed at the Soviet Pavilion of the Brussels World's Fair in 1958 as a photo-correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik. He visited Japan in 1963 and the United States in February-March 1965, at the invitation of Life magazine, as a photographer for Novosti, a Soviet news agency. On the latter trip he was to be accompanied by Feliks Avramovich ROSENTAL, an interpreter but no record of ROSENTAL's arrival is available. KOROLEV is believed to be identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International correspondent in Moscow, Henry SHAPIRO. Both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified SHAPIRO as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate (see Part V.C.).

like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent." As KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time.

On 10 October 1966, however, KOROLEV again appeared at the Paris Match offices, this time with one Feliks ROSENTAL who acted as his interpreter. He displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and he submitted a one-page document in English which gave a short account of NOSENKO's background. The document said in part: "NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident (the defection). Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA." The document, which was in no way represented as coming from a Soviet Government source, also said that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family in Moscow could be obtained and that an interview with the family and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspondent.*

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* According to information available to CIA, a divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request. There is no known precedent for either Soviet-inspired publicity or divorce difficulties in any previous Soviet defection.


Photographs submitted to PARIS MATCH (See Part III.H.)



Subject (circa 1963)




Subject's wife, elder daughter and younger daughter (circa 1965)



Photograph of Subject from passport used for temporary assignments to England in 1957 and 1958 (see Part V.D.8)



Photograph of Subject from passport used on assignment to Geneva in 1964 (see Part III.B.2)



Subject (February 1964)



Subject's father, the Minister of Shipbuilding (1953)

I. Repercussions Within the KGB

1. [redacted] sensitive source

sensitive source

According to [redacted], it was the "unanimous opinion" of the KGB leadership and of KGB officers [redacted] that "NOSENKO could do a tremendous amount of harm to the KGB," and that this damage would be severe for "several years to come." As a direct result, [redacted], new regulations were promulgated to increase KGB operational security in Moscow and abroad.

In addition, the defection brought about the dismissal from the KGB of persons close to NOSENKO and the recall of many officers abroad -- [redacted] -- known to and presumably compromised by NOSENKO.*

Five months after NOSENKO disappeared from Geneva, in July 1964, [redacted] said that 15 KGB officers had already been fired. Among them were GRIBANOV** and a number of his deputies

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* [redacted]

** See Part V.H. regarding NOSENKO's relationship with GRIBANOV.

sensitive source

including one General BANNIK.* Since NOSENKO was GRIBANOV's personal friend and protege, [redacted] stated it had been decided that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans and was therefore ultimately responsible. [redacted] reported further [redacted] that GRIBANOV had been dismissed from the KGB and the Communist Party immediately after the defection, adding that GRIBANOV had personally authorized NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva, despite the fact that he had received a summary statement of NOSENKO's capabilities and activities which contained enough "compromising material" to prevent such a trip under normal conditions.** [redacted] reported having learned that GRIBANOV was the chief of security at a military plant outside Moscow and is considered a "nothing."*** Others dismissed from the KGB included GUK and Ye.A. TARABRIN, Chief of the British Department, First Chief Directorate.****

sensitive source

* [redacted]

** According to NOSENKO in 1965, it was BANNIKOV who supported his candidacy for the 1964 trip to Geneva; as far as he knew, NOSENKO said, GRIBANOV was not involved. Earlier, however, NOSENKO stated that his 1964 trip had been approved by GRIBANOV.

*** Reportedly GRIBANOV continued an operational contact with a Western Ambassador in Moscow until as recently as the autumn of 1964. This is a type of activity in which GRIBANOV was often engaged while serving as Chief of the Second Chief Directorate.

**** In 1962 NOSENKO told CIA: "GRIBANOV and I are very friendly socially and we have often caroused together unofficially... He is very friendly and we often go out drinking together." Under interrogation in April 1964 NOSENKO was asked specifically whether he had ever gone out socially with GRIBANOV after working hours. He replied that he had done so on one occasion and that TARABRIN was present at the time. In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked the same question and this time answered that he had seen GRIBANOV three times socially, most recently in October or November 1963; TARABRIN, he said, was the only other person present on these three occasions; all three outings began as drinking parties in Moscow restaurants and the latter two ended at the homes of girls NOSENKO had been asked to procure. Although [redacted] indicated that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department at the time he was fired, NOSENKO said he had held this position only until 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of the newly established Service No. 2 (Counterintelligence) of the First Chief Directorate.

[redacted]

2. [redacted] source

At the time of NOSENKO's defection, [redacted] told CIA in 1964, he was in training for an illegals assignment in the West, but these plans were cancelled partly because of the NOSENKO case and partly for other reasons not specified to [redacted] One of his handlers informed [redacted] that the NOSENKO matter was very serious, that the KGB was on a "major alert" as a result, and that all missions had been halted to make readjustments.

3. [redacted] source

In Geneva at the time of NOSENKO's defection, [redacted] reported to CIA that just afterwards V.S.MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee* travelled to Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts. [redacted] also reported that the defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEFREMEYEVA, a KGB secretary in Geneva, and among the Soviets there it was rumored that some 60 Soviet officials then stationed abroad would be transferred from their assignments in consequence of the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet representation in Geneva, speculated to [redacted] that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and therefore would have to return to Moscow. Y.I. GUK, said [redacted], who had known and reported on GUK for years, was discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's travel to Geneva, and according to one rumor, the chief of the department where NOSENKO had been employed would lose his job. (This would be A.G.KOVALENKO who, according to NOSENKO, was Chief of the Tourist Department at the time of the defection.)

* MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly stationed in New York City, was said [redacted] to be one of those from the CPSU Central Committee who conduct interviews with KGB personnel going abroad. [redacted] identified MEDVEDEV, then a Counselor at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer and possibly a member of the KGB, "but his role is not important and he works mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

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4. KGB Handlers of Agents

A reflection of NOSENKO's defection was seen in KGB's handling of [redacted], the subject of a lead received from NOSENKO and [redacted] double agent.* [redacted] on 31 March 1964, was questioned by two of the KGB officers about possible surveillance and was asked to provide passport photographs so that "escape" documents could be supplied to him and his family. At this same meeting, the KGB officers announced that [redacted] was being put on reserve status for an unspecified period and told him that this decision had been made about two months earlier (i.e., about the time of NOSENKO's defection). At the next meeting in November 1964, the Soviet handlers admitted to [redacted] that they had "some connection" with NOSENKO. Although NOSENKO probably could not identify [redacted] as a KGB agent, they said, there was a possibility that he knew "what we [the KGB] are doing in Canada."

Also, in Paris, Sergeant Robert JOHNSON was told of NOSENKO's defection by his KGB case officer and was instructed to destroy anything which could identify him with Soviet Intelligence. Although the Soviet told JOHNSON that there was nothing to worry about, he was evidently disturbed by the defection, JOHNSON said.**

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* See Part VI.D.5.c. for full details of the [redacted]

** See Part VI.D.3.c. for a discussion of the JOHNSON case.

IV. NON-KGB ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S LIFE

A. Introduction

The biography of NOSENKO is built largely upon his own statements to CIA, but certain portions of it have been substantiated (as well as contradicted) by other Soviet sources. Given first below is the NOSENKO autobiography for the period preceeding his entry into the KGB, then follows a summary of his statements about his non-professional life since becoming a KGB officer, and finally there is presented a review of what other sources have said on these subjects. A separate section of this paper, Part V, discusses NOSENKO's career in the KGB.

B. NOSENKO's Pre-KGB Autobiography

Although several other sources have since NOSENKO's defection furnished fragmentary information concerning NOSENKO's early personal history, NOSENKO himself has, of course, been the principal source on this topic. He volunteered information during the 1962 meetings, during debriefings in early 1964, and under interrogation in April 1964, in 1965, and in 1966. These various accounts are arranged in separate columns in the following table, and they are organized chronologically from NOSENKO's birth to his alleged entry into the KGB. The first column in the table contains statements which NOSENKO made during the June 1962 meetings in Geneva; these were taken from the transcripts of the meetings and, for the most part, are in NOSENKO's own words. The column headed "1964," derived from the April 1964 interrogation, reflects a number of changes in his story before and during that interrogation. Most of the information given in the "1965" column was taken from discussions with NOSENKO, mainly on his early years, by a CIA psychologist in May of that year; however, material from the February 1965 interrogation and from DERYABIN's interrogation in July and August has also been included when it was not covered in the psychologist's questioning and when NOSENKO signed protocols certifying his statements to be correct. The "April 1966" column is comprised of remarks by NOSENKO in a signed autobiography submitted to CIA at that time. The final column presents the results of the October 1966 interrogation as they pertain to NOSENKO's early life. From column to column appear inconsistencies and contradictions with regard to dates and locations furnished by NOSENKO, although in 1964, again in 1965, and most recently in October 1966 NOSENKO has said that he was "now" telling the truth. The table shows where he has admitted having previously lied about certain events and where he seems to have forgotten his earlier statements to CIA about the occurrence of other events affecting his life.

This tabulation of NOSENKO's autobiography concludes in Part V.A., in which are quoted the various dates and circumstances concerning his entry into the KGB which NOSENKO has given in 1962, 1964, 1965, and 1966.

	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
6	"I was born in Nikolayev, my father worked as a senior mechanic at a plant and took evening courses. Then he graduated from the Nikolayev Shipbuilding Institute."	Born 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, Ukraine, USSR, where he lived with family until 1934.	Born 1927 in Nikolayev where father was a student at the Shipbuilding Institute. Father from simple peasant background, while mother's parents were nobility. (May)	"I, NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, was born 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, an oblast center in the Ukrainian Republic of Soviet Russia."	Born 1927 in Nikolayev, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO and Tamara Georgievna NOSENKO.
		In 1934, at age six, entered the "zero" (nulevoy) class, equivalent to kindergarten, in Nikolayev.	Entered the "zero" class in Nikolayev in September 1934, two months before his seventh birthday. (May)	"In September 1934, in Nikolayev, I entered the 'zero' class. My father was already in Leningrad, where he was working at the Sudomekh Shipyard."	
8	"My father was sent to Leningrad, to the Sudomekh plant, a small plant in Leningrad. He was at the plant for half a year and then became director. This was 1936-1937. Then he was sent to the Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad as Chief Engineer. He was there less than a year."	Moved to Leningrad in 1935, where father was first appointed chief engineer and later director of Sudomekh. Lived at several addresses and attended several schools. [Note: Soviet press stated elder NOSENKO was chief engineer of "several enterprises" in Leningrad during	Moved to Leningrad, probably in spring of 1935. Attended three years of school there, completing First Class in 1935-36, Second Class in 1936-37, and Third Class in 1937-38. (May)	"Shortly thereafter he [father] found an apartment and, interrupting my studies, I travelled to Leningrad with my mother. I did not begin studies in the First Class until September 1935 as there were no 'zero' classes in the Leningrad schools. I finished the Third Class in Leningrad in 1938."	Lived in Leningrad from 1935 to 1938.

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	1935-1937; became director of Baltic Shipyard in 1938.]			
"In 1938 my father was assigned to Moscow as Deputy Peoples' Commissar. I was only a little boy. In 1939 he was appointed Peoples' Commissar, later Minister, of the Shipbuilding Industry and remained such until his death in 1956."	NOSENKO's father was appointed First Deputy to the Peoples' Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry and then became Commissar. Family returned to Moscow and NOSENKO entered 10-year school located on Ulitsa Bol'shaya Polyanka. [Note: Soviet press reported that I.I. NOSENKO became Deputy Commissar in 1939 and Commissar in 1940.]	In 1938 the elder NOSENKO was named First Deputy to the Peoples' Commissar of Shipbuilding and the family returned to Moscow. NOSENKO entered a school on Bol'shaya Polyanka. He completed the Fourth Class in 1938-1939 and the fifth class in 1939-1940. (May)	"In 1938 my father was summoned to Moscow and he began to work in the Peoples' Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry. Having finished the Third Class, I moved to Moscow with my mother at the end of the summer."	
	Completed the Sixth Class at School No. 585. Went to Sochi with parents for vacation and was there when war broke out. Returned to Moscow the next day.	NOSENKO finished the Sixth Class at the 10-year school on Bol'shaya Polyanka during the 1940-1941 academic year. Then he travelled on vacation to Sochi, where the family stayed at a "rest home" of the Council Ministers. Learned of war's outbreak on the radio while there	"In 1941 I completed the Sixth Class at the 585th middle school and went to Sochi for a vacation with my father and mother. On 21 June, during our vacation in the south, the war began and for this reason my parents and I returned to Moscow the next day."	

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
		and returned to Moscow the next day by train. (May)		
	Enrolled in Moscow Special Naval School, but studies did not begin in Moscow because of the war and immediate plans to evacuate the school. In September 1941 NOSENKO spent one week digging trenches with a group from the school, and on 10 October he travelled with the rest of the school to Kuybyshev. There he began his studies in the Seventh Class.	Enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School which was evacuated to Kuybyshev, attended the 1941-42 school year in Kuybyshev. (May)	"In October 1941 my mother and I were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where I completed the Seventh Class in June 1942." [Note: NOSENKO here added a year to his life which he had not mentioned earlier. To accommodate this change he subtracted a year from the time he spent at the Naval Preparatory School in Baku. See below.]	**Went to Chelyabinsk from Moscow in 1941, after the start of the war.**
"I studied first in a school of the Navy. There I sailed aboard boats and cutters." [No date given.]	In June 1942 completed the Seventh Class at the Moscow Special Naval School in Kuybyshev. Returned to Moscow in July with about three other boys from the school. Prevailed on father to allow transfer to "real military school" and enrolled in the Leningrad	In summer 1942 returned from Kuybyshev to Moscow on leave. While there somehow learned that Special Naval School to be moved from Kuybyshev to Achinsk, Siberia. Did not want to go so far away from home, so enrolled in Leningrad Naval Prep School, Baku. Spent	"I completed the Seventh Class in Chelyabinsk. In the beginning of the summer of 1942 I moved from Chelyabinsk to Gor'kiy and soon after this returned to Moscow. In Moscow I was accepted in the Special Naval School which in August 1942 was evacuated to Kuybyshev. There	**Was in Gor'kiy for a time in the summer of 1942.**

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Naval Preparatory School which had been evacuated from Leningrad to Baku. Spent summer vacation at home in Moscow with parents.	summer with parents in Moscow. (May)	I entered the Eighth Class."	
	After 3 1/2 months in Moscow, left by train for Baku with a group of about 30 other students in October. The trip lasted 14 days. Route not recalled. Arriving in Baku joined Prep School and spent about a month in "quarantine." Then assigned to the Ninth Training Company, in the Third Course, equivalent to the Eighth Class. [Note: The Moscow-Rostov railroad line was cut by the Germans by this time. The only possible route at this time would have been a long and circuitous one via Tashkent]	Went to Baku by train in October. Trip took two weeks. Spent first four to six months in Baku in "quarantine," which was similar to American bootcamp. Enrolled in the First Course, equivalent to the Eighth Class. (May)	[In Kuybyshev; see above entry.]	

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Took military oath. [Note: NOSENKO was 15 years old at this time, by law too young to take oath. This point stressed in April 1964 interrogations.]	Took military oath at end of "quarantine" period. Oath administered to make boys feel a part of service although too young. Oath taken between 15th and 16th birthdays, i.e., after October 1942 and before November 1943. NOSENKO certain he celebrated 15th birthday in Baku in 1942. (May)	[Studying in Kuybyshev. See above entries.]	
	Completed Third Course (Eighth Class) in June 1943. Took no vacation but spent summer working at the school in Baku. In September 1943 began new school year in the Second Course, equivalent to Ninth Class.	Completed First Course in June and spent summer of 1943 at school. Entered Second Course at the Naval Prep School in Baku in September 1943. (May)	[Completed Eighth Class in Kuybyshev.] "During the summer of 1943 I returned to Moscow on vacation. The Special Naval School was to be evacuated from Kuybyshev to Achinsk and therefore, not wanting to go to Achinsk, I enrolled in the Naval Preparatory School in Baku.	"I took the military oath in Baku. I was 15 years old at the time. This was in 1943." [No month given.]
	Along with 15 or 20 classmates, NOSENKO submitted a collective letter asking to be sent	Since 1942 NOSENKO had had an "obsession" about getting into the war. Students from	"While at the Naval Prep School in Baku, in October 1943, I joined the KOMSOMOL."	

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	to the front because they had heard that students at the Frunze Higher Naval School had gone. Request caused an uproar and investigations. Permission denied.	the Frunze Higher School had gone to the front in 1942 and some of the older boys at the Prep School went in early 1943. Fired up, NOSENKO and about eight others filed a petition to be allowed to fight. (May)		
	Joined KOMSOMOL.		[See above entry.]	
inning of 1944)				
	In January, together with classmate Yura RADCHENKO, NOSENKO went to the city military commissariat in Baku to inquire about joining a Marine detachment. They were turned down and thereupon ran away from the Naval Prep School. Travelling by boxcar, the two went to Stantsiya Lazarevskaya via Tbilisi and from there walked to Tuapse in search of the mili-	After receiving a scolding from school authorities for having submitted the petition, NOSENKO and several other boys began to plot to run away to the front. When the time came in early 1944 only one other boy, RADCHENKO, would accompany him. The two slipped out of school, made their way to the railway station, and found a freight train heading toward Tuapse. On arriving in Tuapse they were arrested almost immediately	"I studied in Baku only for half the school year because I ran away from school, home to Moscow, in the beginning of 1944!"	The story about going to or toward the front was a lie, NOSENKO said.

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DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
		tary front. Arriving in Tuapse, they were arrested and were then returned to Baku under guard. In Baku, they managed to escape again before being returned to the Prep School. After hiding a few days at the home of a girlfriend, NOSENKO and RADCHENKO travelled to Moscow by train, using forged documentation obtained by a friend in the Naval Prep School. They were arrested at the Moscow Railroad Station by military police who had been alerted by authorities in Baku. NOSENKO's father bailed him out. [Note: Previous accounts varied widely. NOSENKO originally said he had participated in the battle for Novorossiysk with his entire class from the "Frunze Higher Naval School." This battle actually took place in September 1942. On a later occasion, NOSENKO	at the station, several days later they were returned to Baku where they managed to escape. They then travelled to Moscow using false documents and were arrested at the train station on arrival. (May)		

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June 1962	1965	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	said that he and RADCHENKO saw combat near Tuapse.]			
	Took Ninth Class exams after studying as an "external student" at the Gorniy Institute in Moscow. Passed these and through father's influence was transferred back to the Naval Prep School, which had just moved back to Leningrad from Baku. Travelled to Leningrad to join his class in September.	Did not want to return to Baku as ashamed to face classmates after failure to get to front. Remained at home and attended adult education courses at Gorniy Institute and had special tutors in math and Russian grammar. Finished Ninth Class in spring or summer and travelled in fall to Leningrad to rejoin class in Prep School. (May)	"In Moscow I finished the Ninth Class as an external student at Gorniy Institute and at the end of the summer of 1944... was enrolled in the Naval School in Leningrad and travelled there in the month of August."	
	Studies did not start at once. NOSENKO and others lived in Narva and worked in the woods.	Arriving in Leningrad NOSENKO was assigned to a group made up of stragglers and was sent to the forest near Leningrad to cut wood for the winter supply at the school. Conditions were terrible--the work was hard and the weather was cold, damp, and miserable. (May)		

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Studies in Tenth Class of Naval Preparatory School commenced in November 1944.	About three or four days before the boys were to return to Leningrad a car was sent for NOSENKO. He returned to Leningrad to stay in the Hotel Astoria with his father who was visiting with a delegation. After this he went back to school, sometime in November. (May)		
	At the end of April 1945, NOSENKO was shot in the hand at a party by a jealous young officer and was hospitalized. In the ensuing investigation he protected the real culprit by pretending that he had shot himself accidentally while cleaning a gun. He never saw the officer again.	Sometime in February or March, a female acquaintance of an unknown Navy officer began to flirt with NOSENKO. The officer became angry, drew his gun and shot NOSENKO through the hand. The officer was apologetic, and NOSENKO promised not to report the incident. The wound grew worse, however, and NOSENKO was forced to enter the hospital. He told the doctor that he had accidentally shot himself with a souvenir gun. He was hospitalized for about three weeks. (May)	"In the beginning of 1945 I accidentally shot myself through the hand and spent about a month recuperating in the Navy hospital."	NOSENKO shot himself through the hand. This was absolutely accidental and was not an attempt to avoid military duty. [Note: NOSENKO made this statement in response to a direct question. The question was based on a report from [redacted] source [redacted] that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid being sent to the front while attending a "naval college in Leningrad in 1942."]

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DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
May-June 1944	"I finished the Naval School, then was in the Navy. I fought," (boyeval--presumably in World War II). "In 1945 I was demobilized."	While in the hospital, NOSENKO applied for release from military service. This was assisted by father's friends. After release from the hospital he did not want to return to school. He called his father and then spent a week with friends of the family in Leningrad before getting a room in a dormitory at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Tekhnikum. Despite failure to return to the Naval Prep School, NOSENKO was credited with satisfactory completion of the school year (Tenth Class). In June he passed the exams for the Second Course at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum. He then went to the District Military Commissariat and was demobilized. He received his military reserve registration and a certificate of satisfactory completion of	In the hospital NOSENKO decided he could not return to school as he was ashamed of the type of girls he had been with the night of the accident and could not stand the thought of being made an example of by the school KOMSOMOL organization. He left the hospital in civilian clothes and stayed with a friend of his father. He obtained a statement that he had attended the Naval Prep School, which was just a report of his courses and an average of his marks up to that time. As the son of a minister it was then easy for him to enter the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum where, with special tutoring, he was able to complete the Tenth Class in the summer. (May)	"After this [hand shooting] incident I did not want to go back to the school and began to study at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in Leningrad, in the Second Course, in order to complete the Tenth Class. In May or June 1945, with the help of the Director of the Tekhnikum, I received documentation certifying that I had completed the Second Course which made it possible for me to enter the Institute [of International Relations] and I returned to my parents in Moscow."	

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TE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
		ten year's schooling. [Note: A biographical statement was drawn up on the basis of NOSENKO's statements in January-February 1964 and approved by NOSENKO as correct in February 1964. This statement said that he completed his 10-year education at the Baku school in the spring of 1943 and thereby became eligible to enter a higher educational institution. From 1943 to 1945, the statement continued, NOSENBO attended the Frunze Higher Naval School (a counterpart of Annapolis). After three years there, he decided to leave the Navy, was demobilized and entered the Institute of International Relations. In October 1966, NOSENKO said he had lied about attending Frunze Academy.]			
ly 94	"After the war I went to study at the Institute of International Relations...In 1945 I was demobilized.	NOSENKO decided he did not want to study further at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum and returned to Moscow where he	NOSENKO decided he would like a career in the foreign service and returned to Moscow, where he passed the entrance	"In July 1945 I entered the Institute of International Relations."	

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	passed the entrance examinations for the Institute of International Relations (IIR). The exam consisted only of a composition, dictation, and an interview.	exams for the IIR. (May)		
	Travelled to Germany with his father who was leading a delegation. For the purpose of the trip only, NOSENKO was issued a uniform and documents showing him to be a senior lieutenant. When he returned to Moscow he continued to pass himself off as an officer who had seen combat in the war and eventually got into trouble at the institute because of this. Began studies in Faculty of International Law and English language in September.	Travelled to East Germany in August 1945 with father's delegation. Given temporary commission as senior lieutenant for the trip. Continued to wear uniform on return, even to classes at the institute. Entered institute on return from Germany and chose to specialize in English language and U.S. area studies for reasons he could not recall. (May)		

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DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
June 1946		Completed first year at Institute of International Relations.			
eptember 1946		Began second year at IIR.			
June 1947		Completed second year at IIR. Commissioned junior lieutenant in Reserves.	With help of temporary documents used for the trip to Germany, NOSENKO managed to exempt himself from compulsory military training during his first two years at IIR. When it was found that his claims of active duty were false, he was commissioned a junior lieutenant in the Reserves along with his classmates. (May)		In 1947 commissioned a junior lieutenant in the reserves. Did not undergo any military training. After completing second year at the Institute, began to do military translations to avoid military service.
eptember 1947		Began third year at IIR.	In third year at IIR NOSENKO began to specialize in International law. (May)		
Late 1947	[NOSENKO was talk- about his present wife.] "This is my second wife. I was married before... I cannot say that I	While studying at the IIR NOSENKO was dating Augustina Konstantinovna TELEGINA, the daughter of a lieutenant general.	"I was a friend and companion of TELEGINA for some months before her father was arrested in connection with STALIN's campaign	"While I was studying at the Institute, at the end of 1947, I married Augustina Konstantinovna TELEGINA, who was born in 1929"	

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
loved her a great deal,...The war had just ended. I wanted peace. I wanted a quiet corner. I wanted someone to look after me...and so we became acquainted. We saw each other for about two weeks. Let's get married. I married her. That's all." [Note: NOSENKO did not date this marriage other than to imply it was right after the war; it is included here to place it in the context of later statements.]	TELEGIN was arrested by STALIN, and NOSENKO married Augustina soon afterwards, in about November 1947.	against associates of Marshall ZHUKOV. However, we never planned to marry. After the arrest, however, I decided to marry her in order to show my strength of character. I cannot remember the date of the marriage, which was my first. I think that it happened in 1947, but do not know what season or how long after the arrest of TELEGIN." (Interrogation Protocol Signed in February 1965.)		
8 "One Monday...at 10 o'clock [I came home early from work]. Suddenly I heard--I approached on tietoe--What is this? In my bed, who is lying with my wife? Her older brother. Well, I slammed the door, left, and did not go back. Never went back. That was all.	Broke off marriage after several months when he found his wife in flagrante delicto with her brother. The two were separated, but not divorced, at this time. [Note: As with other dates connected with the TELEGINA marriage, NOSENKO has been imprecise here: in	"One morning--I cannot remember the date or season, but it was in the first half of 1948--I came early and unexpected from my studies at the Institute of Internation Relations to the apartment of my wife's mother, where I sometimes met my wife, and surprised her in sexual inter-	"I lived with my first wife until 1949."	

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
Bye bye...Well, you can imagine my horror." [Note: Portions of the tape of this conversation are unreadable. It is clearly implied that this scene took place at NOSENKO's own home.]	April 1964 he said on another occasion that he found his wife with her brother sometime prior to June 1947.]	course with her brother. I walked out without comment. The next day I returned to our apartment where my wife and I continued to live together, although our relationship was strained. I stayed with her because she was pregnant at the time." (Protocol signed February 1965.)		
8	Completed third year at IIR.			
8 "A child was born who might have been mine and who might not have been mine. God knows. There was still no child when I left. Well, I helped out. I sent money. That's all. But I didn't see either her or the child." [Note: NOSENKO provided no date for the above.]		Girl with hare lip and cleft palate born to TELEGINA. NOSENKO decided deformity was due to her incestuous relationship with her brother. Subsequently gave his wife a little money to help support the child, but never considered it his. Marriage cooled still further, but NOSNEKO continued to live in the apartment. (May)		

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Began fourth year at IIR.			
	Completed fourth year at IIR.			
	Successfully defended his thesis on the subject of "Diplomatic Immunity."			
	Completed English language studies.	NOSENKO was through with courses at the Institute in January 1950 and had already defended his thesis on "Diplomatic Immunity." The last half-year at the Institute was relatively free because the students were given time to prepare for the state exams which were required for graduation. (May)		
	In March or April 1950 NOSENKO was interviewed by the assignments commission of the IIR and was tentatively assigned to the GRU. In May 1950 he went to the	Before taking his final state exams, NOSENKO went before the placement board. Here they talked about his possible assignments and although no definite decision was reached	"In the spring of 1950 before the beginning of the state examinations a personnel placement commission was created at the Institute and I declared to it my	The Placement Commission sent NOSENKO to the MGB where he was told he was not a suitable candidate. The reason was for "little things. I was drunk several times, only an average student, etc."

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	GRU Personnel Department for an interview with Colonel KALOSHIN on the instructions of the chief of the "secret unit" at the IIR.	it was suggested he go into the Navy. After this, but before the state exams, NOSENKO visited a special section of the Navy Ministry to give them special documents for a security check. Although it was not stated, NOSENKO believed he was slated for Navy Intelligence. (May)	wish to work in some sort of military organization. Soon thereafter the chief of the Institute's special section gave me a telephone number and told me to call it. The number was K-6...and I realized that the MGB was interested in me since these numbers belonged to the MGB. I called the number and was told to come to the MGB... the conversation [at the MGB] concerned my biography and my knowledge of the English language.. Nothing was said about where it was intended for me to work....Later the chief of the Institute's special section told me my qualifications were not suitable for the MGB."	**NOSENKO said he did not mention this earlier because his interrogators would not have believed that the MGB first turned him down and they later accepted him in 1953.**

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Took state exams for completion of the Institute. Passed three of them but flunked Marxism-Leninism. Advised GRU and was told to call back when he had his IIR diploma. He was allowed to take the Navy physical exam, which lasted three days.	After failing the state exam NOSENKO had someone in his father's office call the GRU to see what he should do. It turned out that the security check would take a long time and NOSENKO was told to check back after he had passed the exam. (May)	"During the summer of 1950, while the state exams were underway, I began to process for entry into the Navy GRU. My processing took place through Colonel KALOSHIN, the Chief of the GRU Personnel Department. Up until March 1951 I repeatedly visited the Ministry of the Navy... I filled out questionaires in duplicate, wrote two autobiographies and submitted copies of my diploma." [Note: NOSENKO in his 1966 autobiography did not mention having failed the exam in Marxism-Leninism.]	
"I finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950, after this I worked in the GRU of the Navy."	Passed exams on second try and received diploma of completion of IIR. Contacted Colonel KALOSHIN of GRU Personnel. Submitted	NOSENKO checked back with GRU Personnel after passing his exams. (May)	"I submitted copies of my diploma to GRU Personnel." [See above entry.] NOSENKO processing for GRU entry.	

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	diploma, transcript of grades, and other necessary papers. [Note: Previously in 1964 NOSENKO stated that he graduated from the IIR, which at that time was a four-year course, in mid-1949 and "just loafed around" for a year. He later changed the completion date to late 1949 or early 1950. Then he changed this to say that he failed exams in 1949 and had been forced to wait an entire year before he could retake them in 1950. Finally he gave the version above.]			
"When they offered me [assignments in] Moscow, Leningrad and the Far East I took the Far East so that nobody could say that Yuriy NOSENKO took advan-	Entered on active duty with the Navy on 17-19 September 1950, when he received orders transferring him from a junior lieutenant in the Reserves to a junior	In the autumn of 1950 received orders transferring him from the Reserve to active duty. Offered a choice of duty posts, NOSENKO chose to go to the Far East "in order to prove he	[See above entries.] Still processing for GRU entry.	

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
tage of his father's position."	lieutenant on active duty. Received orders to the Intelligence Staff of the Seventh Far East Fleet. [Note: In an earlier version, NOSENKO said he entered the GRU in 1949, having finished the Institute of International Relations the same year.]	was now ready to make a man of himself...in the country God forgot." (May)		
"I worked in the field of information in the Far East, in the city of Sovetskaya Gavan...in the field of information--radio intercept, etc. All your movements, when you moved vessels to Chemul'po, Korea, the Korean operation...we knew all the ships there because you talked on the air. You transmitted. We knew each division, its name, its number, everything...	On approximately 1 October 1950 NOSENKO left Moscow by train for the Far East. The trip to Bukhta Postovaya (near Sovetskaya Gavan), where his unit was stationed, took nine or ten days. Assigned to work in the Information Section under Captain Second Rank KHAYTOV. Duties included translations from American Naval literature and making summaries of American Navy OB in	Arriving at his duty station NOSENKO was assigned to the Information Section. He liked the work and did a good job despite the rigorous conditions. During his service here he received special mention as an outstanding officer. There were 300 to 350 intercept operators there. NOSENKO and other officers analyzed the take as well as information received from Sakhalin and Vladivostok. (May)	[See above entries.] Still processing for GRU entry.	

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
and we reported this to Moscow. I don't know what was done with this information after this. So, we were concerned with information."	Far East. There was a unit involved in radio intercept of American Naval targets in Korean area, but NOSENKO was not personally concerned with this work.			
	Promoted to the rank of lieutenant.	After about seven months in the Far East, NOSENKO was promoted to lieutenant. This was April 1951. Normally one is promoted from junior lieutenant to lieutenant only after a year's service in grade. This can be reduced to six months in the Far East. (May)	"On 12 March 1951 two orders were issued by the Naval Ministry; one concerning my enlistment in the Navy and the other assigning me as a translator to the Intelligence Unit of the Seventh Fleet (Military Unit 70176). The following day at KALOSHIN's instructions I reported to the Moscow City Military Commission where I was issued my passport and my voyenyy bilet. The Commission also issued me temporary duty orders and travel documents. On 16 or 17 March I left Moscow for my duty post. I arrived at Bukhta Postovaya at the end of March and	"I lied when I said I started in the GRU in 1950. It was really March 1951." [Note: No effort was made to obtain a reason for this lie or to question NOSENKO on its implications for his earlier statements about promotions, etc.] "I was on active duty in Sovetskaya Gavan--Bukhta Postovaya from 1951 to 1953."

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DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
				began work in the Information Department of the Intelligence Unit of the Seventh Fleet.	
End of 1951		NOSENKO involved in apprentice work in the Agent-Intelligence Section at Bukhta Postovaya. This involved going out to sea on sub-chasers to pick up and drop off, and conducting meetings with agents from Hokkaido and Sakhalin. NOSENKO did not actually meet agents, but was merely along to learn how they were picked up at sea.			
January-February 1952		Filed action by mail to divorce TELEGINA in Moscow court and published intention notice in a local Sovetskaya Gavan newspaper in January or February.	NOSENKO was planning to divorce his wife before he left Moscow but did not start proceedings because he was afraid she would bring charges against him in the KOMSOMOL. Sometime in late 1951 or early 1952 he published his notice		

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DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
			of intent in a local newspaper and forwarded the necessary papers to Moscow. (May)		
April 1952		Left Bukhta Postovaya and returned to Moscow on leave. Arrived at the end of April and reported to KALOSHIN. Requested transfer from the Far East.	On 1 May 1952 NOSENKO's father was to observe his 50th birthday. NOSENKO's two-year tour in the Far East would not be up until October or November 1952, and he was not entitled to any leave until it was ended. However, his section chief was very understanding and arranged for him to leave in April so that he could be in Moscow for the birthday celebration. NOSENKO flew to Khabarovsk where he had a "two-day drunken orgy" with another Naval officer. He then continued on to Moscow in time for the May Day and birthday celebrations. The next day he reported to the Navy Ministry and was told to re-	"At the end of April 1952 I left Sovetskaya Gavan on leave, arriving in Moscow on 28 April."	

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
"I worked in the Far East until 1952, then suddenly I fell ill. In the Far East. It was this way. Then I arrived in Moscow, I went to the doctor. They began to x-ray me. Clear lungs, absolutely. They examined me one day, two days, three days. Clear, absolutely clear. Then by accident, right under my collarbone, a small, small, little spot was found and it turned out to be on a blood vessel. It turned out to be at a very early stage. At that time they had just discovered streptomycin and I was confined at the Hertzen Sanitorium near Moscow. I was there for two months. I felt fine but they	NOSENKO was on leave during May and June 1952 and lived during this time at the home of his parents at No. 4 Ulitsa Gor'kogo in Moscow. He received one month leave for his 1951 service in the Far East and the other for his 1952 service there. [Note: NOSENKO did not mention having had tuberculosis during any interrogations or statements in 1964. According to his 1966 statements, he spent only one year, March 1951 to April 1952, in the Far East.]	turn at the end of his leave for reassignment. (May) NOSENKO was on leave during May and June. No decision had been reached with regard to whether he would return to Sovetskaya Gavan or not and he was "at the disposal" of the Naval Ministry during this period. After the leave, NOSENKO waited another month until his assignment was decided upon. (May) [Note: NOSENKO did not mention having been hospitalized in this period.]	"While on leave I became ill with tuberculosis and spent almost two months in a sanitorium near Moscow." [Note: In another statement, written a week earlier, NOSENKO said that in Sovetskaya Gavan "drunkeness and the severe conditions had their effect on my health and led to an outbreak of tuberculosis in May 1952."]	NOSENKO confirmed that he was at the Herzen Sanitorium during this period and said that as a result of his illness he was "coughing up a half a glass of blood at a time." His treatment consisted of shots of streptomycin.

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DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	gave me shots of streptomycin every hour for two months and stopped this disease at once. After this I had check-ups for five years, was carried on their books until 1957. It was nothing."				
Mid-1952	"They offered me the opportunity to study in the Military-Diplomatic Academy. I went and took a look at the courses they had to offer--Marxism, Philosophy, History, and so on. Well, what did I need this for? I already knew this. I said: 'No, I won't go.'"		During the summer of 1952 NOSENKO was offered assignments to the Military-Diplomatic Academy, to a special Navy espionage school, and to Germany, but turned all of them down for various reasons. He rejected the opportunity to attend the Military-Diplomatic Academy because he had already had 96 per cent of the courses in the Institute. (May)		**NOSENKO was offered an opportunity to attend the Military-Diplomatic Academy, but did not want to go. Besides, he failed the physical examinations for entrance when sugar was discovered in his faeces. NOSENKO drank too much.**
July-August 1952	"After my illness and after the Far East I received orders to the Baltic. On the Baltic there is a city which was formerly	Following his regular leave NOSENKO was ordered by the Navy to proceed to Berlin and Rostok, but refused to go	NOSENKO received orders to Sovetsk and arrived there in late August or early September 1952. In Sovetsk NOSENKO was assigned a political	"During the month of July the Personnel Department of the GRU reached a decision concerning the place of my	**NOSENKO was shown a map of Kaliningradskaya Oblast showing Primorsk to be where he said Sovetsk should be located. NOSENKO continued to**

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June 1962

the German city of Pillau and is now called Primorsk." There NOSENKO was involved in the formation of "agent-observation posts." Suitable candidates were selected from among the crews of ships. They were then formed into groups of three men each and were trained in radio-operation, demolition, etc. After this the groups split up and their members went their separate ways. In case of war the groups were to be reformed and sent behind enemy lines on sabotage and intelligence missions. [Note: The former German city of Pillau is now called Baltiysk, not Primorsk; the latter is a small village nearby.]

1964

when he learned that the Naval Intelligence Points (MRP's) in Germany were closing down and that his final assignment was not definite. He then took more leave (unauthorized) until about 29 July when he left for Baltiysk and reported for duty to the Intelligence Staff of the Fourth Baltic Fleet. He was assigned to a Naval Intelligence Point being set up in Sovetsk, a small town near Baltiysk. There he prepared area training materials for and carried supplies to agents, but did not actually deal with or train them directly. [Note: Previously during the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO said that he had received training near Moscow and was then sent to Rostok and Sassnitz before

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officer's job and helped train sailors for wartime agent missions. His main task was to prepare the training plan for the sailors, to instruct them in subjects such as "The Foreign Policy of the USSR," and generally to see to their needs. (May)

April 1966

further assignment and I was ordered to the Naval Intelligence Point of the Fourth Baltic Fleet Intelligence Unit in Sovetsk, Kaliningradskaya Oblast. Sovetsk is located before you go out on the spit of land where Baltiysk (Pillau) stands. I arrived in Sovetsk in August 1952 and began to work in the Naval Intelligence Unit as a senior translator. Shortly before my arrival the Intelligence Point had been moved from Rostok, in Germany, to Sovetsk. [Note: It was clear from NOSENKO's earlier descriptions that the "Sovetsk" which NOSENKO described is, in fact, Primorsk, a small village on the coast. The only place called Sovetsk in Kaliningradskaya Oblast

October 1966

say that he was assigned to Sovetsk in the summer of 1952. He was asked why, as a son of a minister and as a patient under treatment for tuberculosis, he was not assigned to the Black Sea or somewhere else with a healthy climate. NOSENKO explained that there were no positions available "elsewhere."

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	going to Baltiysk/Sovetsk. He then said this was a lie and gave the version above. The reason for the lie, NOSENKO said, was that he knew we "wouldn't believe the truth"--that he had successfully refused the assignment to Germany.]		is about 40 kilometers inland, and NOSENKO himself had said in 1962 that he served in Primorsk.] [redacted]	
2 No date given for divorce.	In mid-August or September 1952 NOSENKO returned to Moscow from the Baltic for 7 to 10 days to complete divorce proceedings he had initiated in the Far East. This was not counted as leave, but as official business. He then returned to Sovetsk.	"Sometime after my return to Moscow from Sovetskaya Gavan, I carried through with my intention to divorce. My divorce was noted in my Officer's Booklet and nowhere else. I turned this document in to the KGB Personnel office when I began my KGB service and since then have had no record of the divorce. I continued to pay alimony to Augustina TELEGINA (one quarter of my salary) until I left the USSR in		

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
		1964. She kept the name NOSENKO even after she remarried." [Note: This is placed here for comparison with his 1964 statement.]*		
[See next entry.]	NOSENKO did not like his work in Sovetsk [sic] and wanted to return to Moscow to arrange for a transfer. He asked for annual leave which the unit commander refused to give him as he had none due. NOSENKO thereupon went to Admiral GOLOVKO in Baltiysk and with his help obtained leave because of the elder NOSENKO's influential position. NOSENKO then returned to Moscow shortly before New Year's.	NOSENKO disliked his job as a political officer and was disdainful of the low educational level of those he was called upon to train, as well as of the "whole stupid" program. He remained in Sovetsk only until December 1952, when he obtained leave to spend the holidays with his parents in Moscow. (May)	"I remained in Sovetsk a short time and returned to Moscow at the end of the year [1952] with the aim of changing my place of work... While in Sovetsk I received the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service." [Note: See 1965 entry for the spring of 1951.]	
ry- 9§3 "In the beginning of 1953 I came to Moscow [from Primorsk]. This was '53, in the beginning.	"I arrived back in Moscow in December 1952, just before New Year's. I had vacation for the month of Janu-	In January NOSENKO and his parents went to visit the family of General KOBULOV at KOBULOV's dacha in Usov. NO-	"On 1 January 1953 my parents and I were guests at the dacha of KOBULOV who at that time was working in GUSIMZ in East Ber-	

6§: NOSENKO was divorced from TELEGINA during his leave before going to Sovetsk (May and June 1952).

TOP SECRET

June 1962	-964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
in January. Well I came on leave to Moscow. I was there at my father's dacha, near Moscow. KOBULOV came to visit us at the dacha...a conversation started. He asked: 'What are you doing?' I answered: 'I am working in the GRU...I came home on leave.' KOBULOV asked: 'How do you like your work?' I said: 'Speaking frankly, I don't." 'Well,' he said, 'you better come work with us....Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.' KOBULOV was First Deputy to BERIA and a great friend of my father's."	ary. At the end of January, at the end of my vacation I went back to GRU Personnel and saw KALOSHIN...I told him I did not like my job, all that typing, and he said: 'Well, wait a while. Look around.' I was at the disposal of the Personnel Department all of February. I had no work at all. And since I was not working, I did not get any pay for this month. During this vacation I was living with my father and mother on Gor'kiy Street."	SENKO and KOBULOV discussed NOSENKO's dissatisfaction with his Sovetsk assignment and KOBULOV suggested the possibility of NOSENKO getting into State Security work. (May)	lin with the WISMUTH company. This was the first time I met KOBULOV. I don't remember how the conversation came around to me, but I told KOBULOV about my work in the Naval GRU and my desire to change my place of work. He promised to find me a place in the MGB, but this promise was empty conversation."	
y- 53 ed	"After the New Year I went to this sanitorium, Kubinka, 75 or 78 kilometers from Moscow, and I was there January	"I met my [second] wife [Lyudmila KOZHEVNIKOVA] for the first time at the Herzen "House of Rest," one of the	"From the end of January to the middle of March I was under treatment at the sanitorium near Moscow where I had been	

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	and part of February. After that I was home." [Note: This statement was made on 8 April. As no attempt was made to reconcile it with the previous entry, made on 6 April, and because NOSENKO offered no explanation, both are included here.]	"Houses of Rest" of the Council of Ministers. I was resting there for several days. She was there too. It's about 65-70 kilometers from Moscow, not far from Kubinka. I was waiting for my status to be resolved...I didn't want to stay alone at the dacha [his father's]. She was studying philology in the third course at Moscow State University. She had been seriously ill with tuberculosis when she was 17 and still required treatments." (Interrogation, 12 February 1965) [Note: NOSENKO's explanation of his presence at the "House of Rest" was given in response to the specific question: "What were you doing there?"]*	during the summer of 1952. Here I became acquainted with my second wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna KOZHEVNIKOVA.	

TOP SECRET

ay 1965 NOSENKO said: "I met my wife in a House of Rest. I had been at Sosno in January but didn't like it. I tried Dyatkino and met her.

See June 1942 entry: Red Star, on 14 January 1967, reported that seven "special naval schools" were established in 1940 in Leningrad, Moscow, Vladivostok, Gorkiy, Kiev, Odessa, and Baku. There is no indication that any of

C. Personal Affairs Since Entering the KGB

1. Family Life

The Soviet internal passport which NOSENKO carried to Geneva in 1964 confirms his claim that he married Lyudmila KOZHEVNIKOVA on 27 June 1953. (They married approximately six months after he says he first met her at a sanatorium or "rest home" outside Moscow and about three months after he says he joined the KGB.) Immediately after their marriage the couple moved into the home of NOSENKO's new in-laws at Ulitsa Serafimovich 2, Moscow, where they lived until obtaining their own apartment on Narodnaya Ulitsa in January 1955.* KOZHEVNIKOVA's father is Yulian Nikolayevich KOZHEVNIKOV, a metallurgical engineer by training, who held the position of First Deputy Chairman of the State Scientific Research Committee (GKKNIR) of the RSFSR at the time of NOSENKO's defection.**

NOSENKO said that he has two daughters by this second marriage. According to his passport, the eldest of these, Oksana, was born on 21 August 1954 and the other, Tamara, on 13 July 1958.*** NOSENKO in 1962 displayed to his CIA handlers a photograph of the two girls and their mother and made a particular point of noting the close physical resemblance between

* On 23 April 1964 NOSENKO was questioned on the various apartments he occupied in Moscow. He said that, from the time of his marriage to TELEGINA until his departure for his first GRU post in the Far East, he lived in an apartment on Meshchanskaya Ulitsa. He gave up this apartment, he said, in 1950, when his Navy orders came through. Having made this statement, NOSENKO was then asked why the 1951 Moscow telephone directory still listed him at the Meshchanskaya Ulitsa address. He replied that he could not explain but that he was considered to have vacated the house in 1950. (He later said he moved to the Far East in 1951 - see Section IV.B.) NOSENKO then said that the previous tenant at Narodnaya Ulitsa 13 had been one Nikita ISHCHENKO. Although the phone then in the apartment was switched to NOSENKO's name for billing purposes, NOSENKO never bothered to have the change entered in the Moscow phone book; he said that this would have required a visit to a downtown office, the filling out of numerous forms, etc.; besides he added, he did not use the telephone anyway. Therefore, NOSENKO said, from 1955 until his defection in 1964, the telephone in his apartment was listed under the name of ISHCHENKO. He has repeated this story during subsequent questionings. The 1961 Moscow phone directory carries no listing for NOSENKO; it does list ISHCHENKO but gives his address as Krasnokholmskaya Naberezhnaya, not Narodnaya Ulitsa.

** The GKKNIR of the RSFSR is now the GNTK. PENKOVSKIY worked under cover in the GKKNIR of the USSR.

*** NOSENKO has also given his second daughter's year of birth as 1957. In 1962 he told CIA that the older daughter was then studying in the first class at school; in 1965, however, he said she began school in the fall of 1962.

Oksana and himself. He said that he and his wife refer to her as his "double" (kopiya). His wife, in a letter after the defection, referred to Oksana as NOSENKO's kopiya.

NOSENKO's father, the Shipbuilding Minister, died of stomach cancer in August 1956, three years after NOSENKO says he entered the KGB Second Chief Directorate. The period of time surrounding his father's death was, according to NOSENKO, a turning point in his personal and professional life. It was then that he "found himself" after an irresponsible past, drinking and wenching, and indifference to his work.

2. Venereal Disease

The incident which NOSENKO has most often cited as an example of his irresponsibility in the period prior to 1956 involved his illegal use of KGB alias documents to cover treatment for a case of gonorrhea he contracted in 1954, at the time his wife was pregnant with their first child. The CIA psychologist who questioned NOSENKO in May 1966 submitted the following summary of NOSENKO's statements about this incident, which are about as given earlier (during the April 1964 interrogation):

"A girl friend he had known in Leningrad since 1945 came to visit relatives in Moscow in 1954. She called him, and he spent some time with her. She was not a prostitute, and he had slept with her before, so he thought nothing of it. Later he developed what he feared was a venereal disease. Since his wife was pregnant, he was safe both from discovery and the danger of infecting her. He searched frantically around Moscow for a private doctor who treated such diseases, but could not find one. Some of his friends at the office suggested a central clinic that would require no documents. He went here but when confronted with a request for documents, had the choice of showing his KGB certificate or using a false passport he had for business. He tried to talk the doctor into letting him go home to get his documents, but the doctor said he would have to be accompanied by a member of the militia; otherwise he might not come back. He was required to take treatment of a communicable disease. He was forced to give the false document. He came back for treatment about three times and was ordered to report back in two weeks for a final check. They also demanded the name of the girl, but he claimed he had only just met her and did not know who she was. He forgot to go back and a nurse visited the safehouse about two times and left a note for him to report. However, he did not go to the safehouse so knew nothing of the note. In the false passport was a listing of where the named person worked, a fictitious factory. As the result of the clinic inquiries, the request for information got into the hands of the section which made the documents. NOSENKO was called before the deputy chief of the Directorate and severely criticized. He explained what had happened and was given five days of house arrest. However, the chief of his section had also gotten word of the infraction and sentenced him to fifteen days of house arrest without even talking to him. He told his wife he was going on a trip and moved into the administrative room near the office to serve his term. In the meantime, the Secretary of the KGB Party

Committee called NOSENKO's father on the phone and told him the whole story. NOSENKO's father never told either NOSENKO's wife or mother of the incident, but did chide NOSENKO about it. The incident was brought before the Komsomol and discussed. A written reprimand for immoral conduct-unauthorized use of official documents was placed in his record. This was also a final warning meaning that any other infraction would result in expulsion. He made the statement that he had been punished for this incident many times. He could not immediately apply for party membership; the incident was brought up repeatedly in Komsomol meetings and even in party meetings (after he was accepted) as a horrible example; and it kept him from being promoted from Senior Lieutenant to Captain. (The Deputy-Director who gave him five days was a member of the promotion commission.)"

Although there have been slight changes and contradictions in NOSENKO's numerous accounts of this story (the house arrest was variously reported as 5, 10, and 15 days) it remained basically consistent until the October 1966 interrogations when he said for the first time that he contracted gonorrhea from the girl in Leningrad in 1945 rather than 1954. In 1954, he said, he again was infected, this time by a prostitute whom he picked up in the vicinity of the Leningrad Railroad Station in Moscow. When the KGB required that he reveal the source, NOSENKO said, he ascribed the latter case to the original girl from Leningrad. During the October 1966 interrogations NOSENKO also told CIA for the first time that he had had venereal disease on two other occasions while studying at the Institute of International Affairs.

He later began to "feel more a part of the KGB," and as a junior KGB case officer, he personally recruited Richard BURGI in the first successful recruitment operation carried out by the newly-created Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate.* "And in 1956," NOSENKO said in 1964, "before my father's death, I was made a candidate for membership in the Communist Party and, exactly 15 days later, was assigned the rank of Senior Case Officer. I developed a pride in myself, (a feeling) that I can do things. You know how it is. When a person feels that he can, that he has some support, then he works much better. He has more initiative and so forth."

3. Affiliation with Communist Party Organs

NOSENKO said that his formal participation in Communist Party activities began in late 1943 or early 1944 when he joined the Komsomol at the Naval Preparatory School in Baku. This step was a casual one, and he has said that he took it without much thought, mainly because all his friends were

* See Part V.D.4.b. for a description of the BURGI recruitment operation. Until 1966 NOSENKO claimed to CIA that he had received an award for his participation in this operation. In the October 1966 interrogations he retracted this and said that he never received any KGB award for the BURGI or any other operation.

joining. When NOSENKO entered the KGB in the spring of 1953, he transferred routinely to the Komsomol organization there and became Secretary of the Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate. This was a small organization consisting, NOSENKO thought, of about 17 KGB employees; he remained its secretary until June or July 1954, when he got into the trouble over illegal use of operational documents. According to NOSENKO, "Immediately after this incident the Bureau of the Komsomol was gathered, and I was immediately removed from the position of Secretary." A week later, a "strict reprimand" was entered in NOSENKO's Komsomol records.

In October 1954, on the eve of his 27th birthday, NOSENKO was forced out of the Komsomol for over-age.* At that time, the "strict reprimand" he had received several months earlier was remitted on NOSENKO's petition, and he was permitted to leave the organization with a clean record. He was not permitted to join the Communist Party immediately, however. NOSENKO described the situation on 15 April 1964 as follows: "Now I had to prove myself. Not being a candidate for Party membership, I asked them for assignments to show my eagerness, to prove myself. I also asked the Party Organization of the Second Chief Directorate for some 'public service' (obshchestvenniy) assignments. I collected newspapers." For a year, NOSENKO "made good" by running errands and performing other such tasks, until it was decided that he was suitable for Party membership. He applied in January 1956 and was accepted as a candidate member of the Party in June the same year; full membership was granted in 1957. For over a year, from October 1954 until January 1956, NOSENKO said, he had the distinction of being the only employee of the KGB who was neither a Komsomol nor a Party member or applicant.

4. Statements to Others by NOSENKO

Before giving CIA the foregoing details, NOSENKO had talked about himself to several non-Soviets, including persons involved in cases which are reviewed in other portions of this paper. NOSENKO informed the recruitment target Horst BRAUNS that he had two daughters.** He advised Ivan Ivanovich PREISFREUND, a Finnish citizen used in the recruitment approach to a U.S. Army sergeant in Moscow, that he was married, his father was dead but his mother was living, he had served in the Navy, and he had two children. PREISFREUND met the "little girls" and later reported to CIA that, although NOSENKO was a "woman-chaser," he loved his daughters very much.*** With one KGB agent in particular, Arsene FRIPPEL, NOSENKO was especially forthcoming: he told FRIPPEL of his

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* According to the Statutes (Ustav) of the Komsomol in effect in 1954, the maximum age for a Komsomol member at that time was 25. On this basis, NOSENKO should have been excluded in October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday. When this was explained to NOSENKO by DERYABIN in July 1965, NOSENKO replied that he was certain he left the Komsomol in 1954 upon reaching the age of 27, that he was sure the maximum age was 26 at that time, and that no special exceptions were made in his case.

** See Part V.F.9.

***PREISFREUND is discussed in detail in Part V.E.4.a.

service in the Soviet Navy; he dwelt at length on his father's work in the Soviet shipbuilding industry; and while using the alias "NIKOLAYEV" with FRIPPEL, he mentioned that his father had been employed in the town of Nikolayev. On one occasion NOSENKO and his wife dined at FRIPPEL's home.* NOSENKO told his recruitment target George DREW in April 1959 that he had two daughters.

D. <u>Soviets' Statements About NOSENKO</u>

Portions of the NOSENKO autobiography have been supported and other portions contradicted by the statements of several Soviets following the defection. The Soviets' remarks dealing with NOSENKO's KGB career are reviewed in Part V.I., but with reference to other aspects of the background of NOSENKO:

- Letters to NOSENKO in Geneva from his wife (who later went to the U.S. Embassy after his defection) include a reference to one of the daughters as his "double" and two other personal letters in his possession at the time of his defection, Yu. I. GUK and G. I. DUCHKOV, referred to visits to NOSENKO's wife and children.

- A KGB officer in Vienna, Vladimir TULAYEV, told a CIA double agent that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came from a wonderful family, loved his wife and children, and earned a good salary. TULAYEV later told the agent that he had "friends who knew NOSENKO well."**

- A Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, Feliks KOVALEV, said to a CIA agent that NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background, was the son of a Minister in the government, was notorious for his "adventurous" nature, and was "famous for his character."

- The Soviet Navy defector Nikolay ARTAMONOV said he attended a naval preparatory school with NOSENKO in 1944 to 1946. (ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of the dates involved, however, differs from NOSENKO's.) sensitive source

- [redacted] reported NOSENKO is the son of a former Soviet Government Minister, attended naval college, shot himself to avoid going to the front with the rest of his class, was graduated from the Institute in 1950, and contracted venereal disease in 1950 but through his father's influence avoided damage to his career. [redacted] sensitive source [redacted] from conversations with fellow officers [redacted] He has indicated that he does not know NOSENKO.

* FRIPPEL is discussed more fully in Part V.D.5.

** In October 1966 NOSENKO failed to identify TULAYEV either by name or photograph and said he didn't know him.

sensitive source
- [redacted] said that when NOSENKO was a young man, he attended the GRU Military-Diplomatic Academy and then spent a short time, perhaps a year, in the Information Department at GRU Headquarters. NOSENKO had been a "very undisciplined person" while in the GRU and "not very good," [redacted] continued, and he was discharged from the GRU. However, his father, an "influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding," was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. [redacted] said he did not know NOSENKO personally, but learned this information from "various persons" (unnamed) in Moscow.

- The thumbnail biography of NOSENKO which KOROLEV and ROSENTAL submitted to the editors of Paris Match in October 1966 (see Part III.H.) stated that NOSENKO was "closely acquainted with the country's leaders, families, and homes" and that his "father who died several years ago was an important official in the Party and state organs." The document went on to say that "NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, mother and a brother (younger)." KOROLEV and ROSENTAL also provided photographs purporting to be of NOSENKO's wife and daughters.

source
- [redacted] said she heard from her KGB friend V. G. SVIRIN that NOSENKO's father was a Minister or a General of Ukrainian origin and that his mother was Jewish and "was always involved in some blackmarketeering." She also said that she heard NOSENKO was a "civilian," not a KGB officer, but was connected somehow with the KGB. (She could not explain this connection other than to say that all Soviets permitted to meet foreigners are either officers or "relatives" of the KGB.)